Liabedzka: Would it have been better if Kebich had defeated Lukashenka in 1994? No!
Would it have been better if not Lukashenka but Kebich had won in 1994? My colleague Siarhei Navumchyk categorically answers : yes! With the same categoricalness, I say: no! — writes on Facebook Anatol Liabedzka, former deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation, who was part of Aliaksandr Lukashenka's team in the 1994 elections.
If I were to answer this question in one sentence, my deep conviction is this: if Kebich had won in 1994, today Belarus could be the 90th subject of the Russian Federation. And the Belarusian economy would be entirely working for the war in Ukraine, and Belarusian families would be receiving funeral notices from Putin's war.
Why? Kebich was an organic part of the old Soviet nomenklatura. Not just by biography — he was formed by this system to his very core. He headed the State Planning Committee of the BSSR, and his political thinking remained the thinking of a man from the Soviet political and economic system.
His model of Belarus can be described very simply: take a suitcase from "Belovezhskaya," get on a plane and fly to the Kremlin and the State Planning Committee to solve all issues. He couldn't imagine it any other way.
This was the whole meaning of his vision of Belarus: not as an independent state that determines its own future, but as part of a large economic and political system, the center of which is in Moscow.
And here I would advise simply reading Kebich himself. In 2008, his autobiographical book "Искушение властью: из жизни премьер-министра" (Temptation by Power: From the Life of a Prime Minister) was published. This is not an interpretation by his political opponents. This is his own reflection on himself, his era, and his political activity. And it is a very revealing book. It clearly shows nostalgia for the Soviet Union, regret over its collapse, and the conviction that it was a great historical mistake.
Kebich himself clearly and unambiguously answered what he would have done if he had won in 1994! Moreover, already in 1993, specifically under Kebich, Belarus was already marching down the path of deepening military, economic, and political rapprochement with Russia. Let's recall the CSTO, attempts to introduce the Russian ruble.
Yes, Kebich was much less ambitious than Lukashenka. And here's the paradox. This very fact could have been even more dangerous for Belarus.
Yes, Lukashenka is sick with power. He didn't want to give it up to Moscow or anyone else. When he had to conflict with Russia, he did it not for Belarusian independence, but for his right to be the sole owner of Belarus. But as a result, these personal ambitions at certain moments also worked for the preservation of the state itself.
Kebich was different. It was much easier to integrate him into the Moscow system. And if a person doesn't have a clear vision of an independent Belarus in his mind, if all his life he thinks in terms of a union center, the State Planning Committee, and the old nomenklatura, to suddenly expect a national state-building transformation from him is no longer historical analysis, but a pipe dream.
The "cost" of Kebich for the Kremlin was significantly lower than the "cost" of Lukashenka.
But there is another, much more unpleasant and complex question. Perhaps the problem was not only with Lukashenka and not only with Kebich?
Why did the democrats in 1994 march in three columns? Why couldn't they offer society a unified vision for the future? Why did they lose so many opportunities in the first years of independence? This is what needs to be analyzed today, not creating a myth about "good Kebich," who supposedly could have saved Belarus.
And the main conclusions.
Both Lukashenka, as time has shown, and Kebich were a dead end and a catastrophe for Belarus. It's just that with one, this dead end has been dragging on for more than thirty years, and with the other, in my deep conviction, it could have ended much faster – with the loss of real independence and the full incorporation of Belarus into Russia.
Therefore, today's Lukashenka should not be used to whitewash yesterday's Kebich. We must finally deal with the systemic mistakes that the democrats themselves (including me) made in the 1990s.
Because if we do not conduct this analysis, we risk repeating the same mistakes again – only in a different historical situation.
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