Moroccan breakthrough into Ceuta: What was it? Could it be Washington's subtle revenge on Madrid? And will it affect the legalization of Belarusians?

On Thursday, July 30, thousands of migrants broke through into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, located on the African coast of Morocco. According to local authorities, up to 60,000 people crossed the border; according to the central government, up to 40,000. Whatever the number, it far exceeds the last record breakthrough in 2021, when up to ten thousand people entered Ceuta. As of Friday evening, more than thirty-five thousand have returned to Morocco.

What are Ceuta and Melilla?

Ceuta and Melilla are two Spanish enclaves located on the African continent, bordering Morocco. Spanish presence there dates back hundreds of years, while Rabat's claim to them is based on the fact that the cities are on the African continent and therefore should belong to Morocco. Madrid does not recognize this claim, and the residents of the enclaves have repeatedly expressed their desire to remain part of Spain.

Why and how did the migrant invasion of Ceuta happen?

This invasion is not the first. In 2021, ten thousand undocumented migrants had already broken through into Ceuta. Isolated incidents of a similar nature had occurred even earlier. Despite the fact that the land border with Morocco is fortified with a multi-meter fence and an increased presence of border police, migrants can arrive by sea, bypassing the breakwater on the border near Tarajal beach.

To avoid the latter, Spain relied on cooperation with the Moroccan side, which bore fruit: despite the relative ease of entering the enclave by sea, the flow of undocumented migrants was small, as almost all were turned back by Moroccans. But both incidents of mass invasion were accompanied by reports of "Moroccan border guards simply standing and watching."

It is widely accepted that the 2021 incident was a reaction to Madrid's agreement to admit Brahim Ghali for COVID treatment. Brahim Ghali is the leader of the so-called Polisario Front, which fights for the independence of Western Sahara, which Rabat considers part of Morocco.

Weeks after Ghali's transfer to a Spanish hospital, thousands of migrants broke through into Ceuta with the apparent inaction of Moroccan authorities. The latter never admitted responsibility for this, but their complicity is evidenced by a series of smaller incidents that occurred after the major breakthrough. The flow of migrants almost stopped only when, in 2022, Madrid agreed to the Moroccan proposal for autonomy for Western Sahara.

It is quite probable that the record breakthrough on July 30 was Rabat's reaction to the warming of relations between Madrid and Morocco's perennial rival – Algeria, which supports the independence of Western Sahara. The 2021 incident was also related to this territory.

An additional impetus to the events could have been the recent decision by Spain's National Court, which prohibited the automatic expulsion of migrants back to Morocco if they illegally crossed the border into Ceuta.

What will happen next with the migrants in Ceuta?

Madrid has deployed the army, which will reinforce border security. Most of those who arrived have already voluntarily returned to Morocco. Diplomacy will then determine how often such incidents recur (as I wrote – such an influx is only possible with Rabat's assistance). But, despite the latter's desire to use migrants as leverage on Western Sahara, Madrid has powerful visa leverage: like France once did, Spain can significantly reduce visa issuance to citizens of a country that facilitates illegal migration. Although, most likely, it won't come to that: apart from these two cases, cooperation between the border guards of the two countries has been excellent.

Furthermore: Morocco is included in the EU's list of safe countries, which means immediate (literally) expulsion of undocumented migrants back in accordance with the provisions of the Pact on Migration, which came into force this year. In addition, Ceuta is not part of the Schengen area, which makes further transit of arrivals into the European Union impossible.

Could this be Washington's revenge on Madrid?

Could this be a provocation by Washington to take revenge on Madrid for criticizing the operation in Iran and at the same time clearly demonstrate the horrors of uncontrolled migration?

Theoretically yes: J. D. Vance, along with Trump, has already commented on the situation and will definitely use them in their election campaign. Spanish Prime Minister, socialist Pedro Sánchez, has long been an object of their attacks; they became especially sharp after the ban on using bases in Spain for attacks on Iran. However, the ties between Rabat and Washington are not so close that the former would risk relations with neighboring Spain. Most likely, this is purely a question of Western Sahara – and the migration lever as a convenient means of pressure. But Rabat is unlikely to engage in a long confrontation: economic relations between Morocco and Spain are at a high level, and neither side will want to risk a rupture. It is in Rabat's interest that the border with the enclaves remains quiet.

What will change for Belarusians after the mass migration to Ceuta?

Well, for Belarusians, nothing will change. Approaches to migration in most EU countries have long been moving towards increased restrictiveness, so the Ceuta crisis will add nothing new here. Madrid's policy regarding migrants will not change as long as Sánchez's party is in power: if emotions are set aside, migration is the engine of the fastest growth in the eurozone. The desire for more migration is Madrid's pragmatism (but, of course, not in the way it happened in Ceuta).

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