Apocalypse Tomorrow. Statkevich wrote his first article — with a warning about the danger from Russia

European leaders stubbornly claim that a war in Europe will begin in the coming years with an attack by Russia.

These statements cannot but have serious grounds. I believe that European intelligence agencies have drawn serious conclusions after their failure in early 2022, when only American electronic and British human intelligence uncovered Russia's preparations for an attack on Ukraine, and they have serious reasons to give their leaders such forecasts. Let's make our own analysis of the situation and form our own forecast for its development, as this directly affects the fate of our country.

Let's consider the Kremlin's motives for unleashing a new war (the main one being the failure to achieve the goals of the war with Ukraine), its decision-making mechanisms, and the degree of readiness to use nuclear weapons.

I. War Goals and Their Achievement

1. Preventing NATO expansion and its approach to the borders of the Russian Federation is only a formal pretext for war.

But the situation for the Russian Federation in its confrontation with NATO has only worsened after the start of the war. Sweden and Finland joined, as a result of which the Russian Baltic Fleet found itself surrounded by hostile shores and even partially turned into a lake fleet – some small missile ships are being transferred to Lake Ladoga, where, after launching "Kalibr" missiles, one can hide from a retaliatory strike, at least in the skerries. And from Finnish territory, as well as from the Gulf of Bothnia, it is now possible to strike at atomic submarine bases located in the bays of the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula, even with tactical missiles and drones. Also, the Kandalaksha railway station, where railways from St. Petersburg and Arkhangelsk converge and through which the peninsula is supplied with everything necessary, is now within their reach. Thus, most of the most important component of the Russian nuclear triad is under threat.

2. The real main reason for the war was not the conquest of Ukraine, but rather the Ukrainians themselves — another 40-45 million new subjects for the empire, as the population of the Russian Federation is shrinking.

The Far Eastern Federal District, which makes up 40% of the country's territory, is home to only 7.8 million people. The difference in population density on both sides of the Russian-Chinese border is more than 100 times. With increasing dependence on China, this could threaten Russia with the loss of eastern territories in the strategic long term.

And now, instead of millions of fast-moving Ukrainian "migrant workers," the Kremlin has received an enraged people, ready to maintain a million-strong army, against which it now also needs to have an army of similar size.

3. An attempt to overcome the crisis of national-historical consciousness of Russians after the collapse of the USSR.

Wars usually begin with history teachers who talk about "ancient lost lands," instilling in students pride in past greatness and a desire to regain what was lost. Real history is mercilessly falsified in the process. German militarism of the last century, in fact, began in the century before last, when a gigantic statue of Germanicus, the leader of local tribes who managed to destroy several Roman legions through deceit and betrayal, was erected on the Rhine. At the same time, Charlemagne, the creator of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which included almost all of Europe, and his conquests were glorified.

Naturally, this led to a desire to regain the "lost." And, as a consequence, to the war of 1870 with France, to the First World War, to Hitler's "master race" theory and everything that happened later. In the Russian version, this began with the theory of the "triune Russian people," thus appropriating the history of Kievan Rus'. Then it turned out that Kyiv became the capital of independent Ukraine, and its history, naturally, part of the history of the Ukrainian people, which contradicted stereotypes deeply embedded in Russian mass consciousness. Questions even arose about the self-name of the nation. The Kremlin tried to "on the fly" propose a new answer to the question "Where did we come from?", based on an unconfirmed legend about the Apostle Andrew the First-Called's stay in Chersonesus (near modern Sevastopol).

And on the real fact of the baptism of the Kievan prince Vladimir (who, by the way, according to the appearance described by Byzantine historians, looked exactly like a Zaporozhian Cossack of a later period, even with an "oselydets" - Cossack forelock). Nevertheless, a new "sanctuary" for the people was urgently built near Sevastopol. But, as the puppet character of then-independent Russian television, Khrun Morzhov, once said: "It's not convincing." And now, after four years of war, there are no doubts about the national distinctiveness of Ukrainians and their separateness from Russians, even among Russians themselves.

Much is now said about the need to combat the falsification of history, meaning only the history of the Soviet-German war. I agree, falsification of history is a very dangerous thing. All history. The only effective cure for imperial complexes is the blood of sons. I think that so that none of the peoples have to take this bitter medicine, it is time for independent historians to compile a common objective version of the region's history over the last thousand years. And to widely disseminate it in an accessible form (for example, in the form of comics).

4. The desire to force the West to lift the sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea.

In the Kremlin, due to the light (too light) tongue of one local politician, the opinion somehow took root that European politicians "have no balls," unlike "tough" dictators. But four years ago, it turned out that this accessory is also present in democratic leaders. And claiming the opposite indicates ignorance of the region's history.

In 1939, Stalin issued an ultimatum to the Baltic countries and Finland that they accept Soviet military bases. At that time, dictators ruled in the Baltic countries. They accepted Stalin's terms because they feared him less than their own people. These countries lost their independence.

But parliamentary Finland refused. The parliament granted broad powers to organize defense to General Mannerheim, whom the parliamentary social democratic majority, to put it mildly, did not particularly like: 20 years earlier, during the suppression of the local Red Guard uprising, he sent many comrades and friends of social democratic deputies under the ice of the Gulf of Finland. After that, he was almost untouchable for about 20 years, but he created a public organization and, predicting Soviet aggression, trained many thousands of ski-shooters and snipers in it, who became a real nightmare for the Red Army during the war with the USSR, in which the latter suffered a disgraceful defeat.

Thus, four years ago, showing masculine qualities, European politicians not only were not frightened and did not lift sanctions, but began an economic war against the Russian Federation, due to which the Russian economy is in recession, masked in public statistics for propaganda purposes with the help of a deflation coefficient. Significant additional financial losses are incurred by the propaganda demonstration of the absence of international isolation. Visits of leaders of so-called "friendly countries" to Moscow cost the budget tens of billions of dollars, because "friends" come only for significant discounts on Russian oil or gas.

The Russian Federation's share in the world's gross domestic product (GDP) is about 3% and is falling, and statements that in reality, taking into account purchasing power parity (PPP), the Russian Federation has already overtaken Germany are not in favor of Russian propaganda, because if this PPP is taken into account for all countries, it will turn out that the Russian Federation has already been overtaken by Indonesia, and Brazil is close behind.

Even if the "hot" war in Ukraine stops, the economic war with countries that generate more than half of the world's gross product will continue, which will lead the Russian economy to recession and a social crisis of failure to fulfill numerous social obligations to war veterans and their families, and very likely – to a political crisis with a change of power.

Thus, the Russian Federation has not achieved any of its true war goals and has found itself in a dead end with poor prospects.

This war became a strategic mistake for the Kremlin. And with a strategic mistake, any action, as well as inaction, only worsens the situation.

Let's consider the reasons for this failure of the country's leadership, its intelligence, and diplomacy. Let's consider the decision-making mechanisms of the Kremlin that led to this error.

II. Kremlin Decision-Making Mechanisms

It is already obvious that these mechanisms are based on the stereotypes of Russian mass consciousness and propaganda and historical myths, and exclude the participation of independent conscientious experts.

The main and most dangerous of these stereotypes is about the existence of a "triune Russian people," and that Ukrainians and Belarusians are "artificially created nations." From their point of view, this means that the mentality of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples is the same.

This stereotype formed the basis for predicting the reaction of Ukrainians to the Russian invasion. But the reaction of the Ukrainian people turned out to be completely different from what was expected, which indicates deep mental differences between the two nations. The reasons for this difference must be sought in their genesis. In the 9th century, Kyiv was captured by the Rus' – in the languages of all Scandinavian peoples of that time, this word meant "warrior-robber"; it was how Vikings, then sea pirates, called themselves, making the city their base for further attacks. Thus, "Kyiv and its environs" became Rus'.

Thus, the only heirs of those Rus' are today's Ukrainians, who inherited the positive and negative traits of those robbers. Russians have a different origin. Just don't mention the ridiculous propaganda myth, invented later by the descendants of the Varangians to justify their right to rule, about the "invitation of the Varangians to Rus'." Does this mean that Novgorod merchants, stern, greedy, and brave people, called on robbers to bring order to their money chests and fur warehouses? Do you really believe that?

Let's turn to the authoritative Russian historian Solovyov, who divided the then population into two categories: `muzhi` (men, warriors) and `muzhiki` (peasants) or `smerds` (serfs). The former were the prince's retainers or boyars (then predominantly Varangians) — true people who had weapons, knew how to use them, and were ready to defend their honor, their loved ones, and property with weapons in hand. The latter were "small incomplete people" who could not do this and were only "fodder" for the former. It is deeply symbolic that in Russia, a word that before the reform of 1863 was the name for agricultural slaves, is still a compliment to a man.

Thanks to stereotypes about the existence of a "triune Russian people," the Kremlin decided that the descendants of `muzhi` would behave like the descendants of `muzhiki`. This is a big mistake. The same mistake is made regarding Belarusians.

The topic is so important and dangerous for us that I must dwell on it in detail.

In the colony, I had a period when I was not given books from the local library for 5 months. So I read everything in a row that my neighbors had. Once, I was given a thick (and therefore very valuable in those conditions) book by one of the apologists of the "Russian world," Maxim Kalashnikov. The real surname of this machine gun-assault rifle pseudonym, as one might easily guess, is the banal Kucherenko. The book, as is typical for literature of this kind, exposes a global conspiracy against Russia, and also contains a historical overview with a large number of elementary factual errors, which made me doubt the author's declared historical education.

But there was one chapter that caught my attention. The author examines the mentality of Russians based on their attitude to land, power, church, etc. In total, along 7 directions. He examines it quite objectively and frankly. I analyzed the mentality of Belarusians according to his scheme. Coincidences with Russians were only in half of one of the points. If we consider them equally important, then Belarusians coincide in their mentality with Russians by 7%. That's somehow too little for a "single people." Especially since 2020 clearly revealed the existence of our distinctive independent nation. And what a nation!

The propaganda campaigns unleashed by the Kremlin also significantly influence decisions.

The peculiarity of propaganda is that its authors sooner or later begin to believe in its truth. That is, they talked so long about "Ukraine is an underdeveloped state, poke it – it will fall apart, and the clown will run away," that they themselves believed it. But Ukraine did not fall apart, the "clown" turned out to be a worthy president, and now the Kremlin does not know how to extricate itself from this war while saving face.

Moreover, when propaganda stereotypes become embedded in public consciousness, the actions of the authorities must correspond to these stereotypes, which deprives the authorities of the possibility of political maneuvering.

The worst thing is when the first person of the country is engaged in propaganda. Independent analytics become impossible in such a case. Because experts and advisers must tailor their positions to the opinion of the first person and merely re-voice the official position. Collective decisions are impossible in such conditions and become unilateral, which affects their quality, because the first person, deprived of expert support and having their own motives and interests, often makes decisions harmful to their country or even gets into absurd situations, as was the case with the President of the Russian Federation, when he publicly cited unrealistic data on Ukraine's combat losses.

I have no doubt that he was only voicing the information officially provided to him by Russian generals. There was no experienced adviser nearby who could explain that among generals from Soviet times, the principle "The main thing is to report correctly" dominated. This leads to an excessive overestimation of enemy losses. So, during the Soviet-German war, according to reports from Soviet troops, the total losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to more than 80 million people, which exceeded the total population of pre-war Germany.

Thus, the decision-making system in the Kremlin is unilateral, without qualified expert support, and under the strong influence of Putin's desire to retain power. Additional risks are created by the leader's personal decision-making practices.

The method articulated by Putin, "load the task into the brain overnight and wake up in the morning with a ready solution," is indeed effective. I myself used it for working on dissertations. But it is only suitable for passive objects. Attempts to apply it in politics, where the objects of the decision are active and possess their own will, have, as a rule, led to political errors and losses.

Thus, the existing decision-making system in the Kremlin carries high risks of ill-conceived adventurous decisions.

In summary, it can be asserted that in such a system, the decision to start a war, even with the use of nuclear weapons, is very likely.

Therefore, the risk of the Russian Federation unleashing a war with the West is indeed high.

Let's consider where such a war might begin and what risks it poses for our country and the world.

III. The Belarusian "Balcony"

This is what Russian generals call our country, because from our territory, strikes can be launched against three NATO countries and Ukraine. The capitals of these countries are at a dangerously short distance from the Belarusian border.

It is obvious that the first strike of Russian troops will be launched from Belarusian territory and directed against the Baltic countries, which are geographically isolated from large NATO countries and can be cut off from them. In addition, their occupation will allow the Baltic Fleet to regain operational space and secure sea communications with the Kaliningrad region, and provide more guarantees for the export of Russian hydrocarbons from the ports of the Leningrad region.

The main strike will not be directed at Estonia, whose eastern border is covered by large lakes, but at Latvia, in order to reach Riga or the Gulf of Riga and cut the Baltics in two, with the aim of depriving the defending forces of maneuver, and, at least in the Eastern Baltic, of supplies and reinforcements. The strike will be launched from the Polotsk area. Simultaneously, a strike will be launched from the Grodno area towards Kaunas and Klaipėda. It can be reinforced by a Russian strike on Kaunas from the territory of the Kaliningrad region, to then capture Klaipėda and prevent the use of this port for delivering reinforcements and military equipment. Another strike may be launched from the Oshmyany area on Vilnius due to the appealing proximity of this city to the border.

You may ask, why am I predicting this so confidently? Simply, Russian generals like to use the developments of their Soviet counterparts. For example, the truly very successful and most effective of all operations in World War II in terms of its results, "Bagration." One only needs to look at the maps of this operation.

In the autumn of 2015, after another release, speaking at a conference held in Warsaw under the auspices of the OSCE, and commenting on the deployment of a motorized rifle brigade in the Bryansk region, I expressed the opinion that this brigade could be used against Ukraine for a strike on the right bank of the Dnieper towards Kyiv, which the Soviet army had already done in the previous war. Only then, for this, they had to cross the Dnieper in the Loev area with heavy losses. And now it is possible to comfortably cross it and the Pripyat via bridges in Belarus. Which the Russian invasion group did four years ago. Without such an opportunity, the Russian blitzkrieg would have been impossible, and the war with Ukraine would not have started at all.

Unfortunately, my forecast at that time came true 7 years later, which confirmed the effectiveness of the approach. And now before me lies a book with maps of Operation Bagration, more precisely, its 2nd, "Baltic" part, which makes the task of forecasting easier.

IV. Use of Nuclear Weapons

This idea, apparently, has been discussed among Russian generals since the 2000s. Specific plans, if one believes what appeared in the independent press, were as follows: suddenly start military operations, seize as much territory as possible, and then, when NATO mobilizes to respond, deliver a nuclear strike to consolidate the captured territories through negotiations with "spineless" intimidated European politicians.

Now, when European politicians have shown completely different qualities than expected, the idea of a preventive nuclear strike on NATO nuclear forces' deployment sites in Europe has emerged and is actively discussed in the Russian semi-military press, so as not to receive a "response" after using nuclear weapons against NATO, for example, in the Baltics after the invasion of Russian troops there. The most likely place for a Russian nuclear strike will be the Suwałki Gap, to make it impossible to send reinforcements through it to the Baltics, if the railway there is destroyed, the asphalt on the highway burns, and all this is covered with burning radioactive trees.

Other possible targets are "bottlenecks" of trans-Baltic highways, places where reinforcements and material resources are concentrated. Now Russian generals understand that there will be a Western "response" to this and are looking for ways to avoid this response - heaven is heaven, but one wants to live. Ideas on how to prevent this are actively discussed.

For example, in "Weapon" magazine, the discussion of options for a preventive nuclear strike on the deployment sites of NATO tactical nuclear forces has become a constant theme.

Their hopes are as follows: if the strike is carried out with tactical nuclear weapons, the US with its powerful strategic nuclear forces will not intervene, because, as the author of the proposal notes with mocking surprise, they somehow believe that strategic and tactical nuclear war can be different.

In the event that the Russian Federation only strikes with tactical nuclear weapons of shorter range, then the US, in their opinion, will use this as a reason not to use its long-range strategic nuclear weapons and thus not unleash a global nuclear war. Thus, Russia only needs to neutralize 100 tactical thermonuclear aerial bombs with a power of 500 kilotons each, located at NATO airbases in Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and also destroy Britain's nuclear potential, because the French Constitution allows it to use nuclear weapons only for self-defense in case of a nuclear attack on its territory. True, the author does not explain how, from the point of view of the French Constitution, a nuclear strike on a NATO airbase in Germany near the French border would be regarded if a shock wave and radioactive clouds moved towards France.

The author sees no problems with Britain at all. There are four nuclear submarines with Poseidon missiles with nuclear warheads, two of which, ready to launch these missiles, are on combat duty in port, where they can be easily destroyed, and the third is on such duty in the open sea. The author believes that if the Russian Federation has an atomic submarine-destroyer of enemy submarines, then that Russian submarine can find and destroy the only British submarine on duty at sea. Perhaps he does not know how difficult a task it is - first to detect a NATO submarine with its latest stealth technologies in the World Ocean, let alone a specific one. Such reasoning surprises with its incompetence. But this is the current level of Russian experts, and their conclusions may be in demand.

It seems that the Kremlin has embraced the idea of a preventive nuclear strike on the West. At the same time, they fully admit that there will be a retaliatory strike. And they have figured out how to do the first while minimizing the threat of the second.

V. Quasi-Tactical Missile

The appearance of the so-called "Oreshnik" ("Hazelnut") missile initially surprised. Why such an expensive-to-maintain and vulnerable-to-attack machine? It is clear that in war, any weapon is used. Including old tanks and cannons. So why just scrap old "Yars" missiles when you can remove one stage and reduce their range to 5500 kilometers?

When you can use them at least for firing dummy rounds. Moreover, as was evident even from a newspaper photograph of the strike on "Yuzhmash," without any guidance for these dummy rounds - as if they just threw a handful, hoping one might hit somewhere.

It's like bringing a Tsar Cannon to the front. Expensive and ineffective.

But what was alarming was that the "Oreshnik" remained under the command of the Strategic Missile Forces, where it was from the beginning.

This means that the systems for storing and delivering nuclear warheads, and for their use with special codes (the so-called "nuclear briefcase"), have also remained. This implies that the "Oreshnik" can very quickly be transformed back into a ballistic missile: just remove the warhead with metal dummy rounds and replace it with the old "Yars" warhead of slightly reduced range, which formally reclassifies it from strategic to tactical while retaining its former set of munitions and terrifying destructive power: 3-6 warheads with a total yield of up to 500 kilotons.

Thus, the Kremlin, by creating a hybrid, formally tactical "Yars," has prepared a weapon for a preventive nuclear strike on Europe, which, in its opinion, should not provoke US involvement in a retaliatory strike. But, apparently, Moscow does not hope that a "response" can be avoided, either from British or French atomic submarines.

Therefore, to avoid a strike on its own territory, it decided to expose another, formally still independent country to this strike.

VI. Why Nuclear Weapons in Belarus

The Kremlin's decision to deploy Russian nuclear weapons on our territory is surprising from the outset. Usually, they are placed in a guaranteed safe location, not in direct proximity to a combat zone where they could be hit by the enemy, and on the territory of another state whose people do not want them, because people intuitively understand - their own nuclear weapons truly protect the country from aggression, while foreign ones make it a hostage of another state, which may have completely different, unknown plans and interests.

Moreover, Putin immediately and categorically refused any form of Belarusian control over these weapons. All these statements that we now have nuclear weapons, that "we will press the button together (use Putin's 'nuclear briefcase')" — this is either deception or (which is much worse) self-deception.

First, they announced the deployment of nuclear aerial bombs for Su-25 aircraft (including Belarusian ones). Then, "Iskander" medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Now, they are deploying the hybrid "Yars" (aka "Oreshnik"). A storage facility for nuclear warheads is also being built.

Why on our land? To be closer to a potential enemy, they have the Kaliningrad region, where nuclear "Iskanders" are already located. The hybrid "Yars" has a range of 5500 km, which is twice less than the unshortened one. So, deploy it in your own territory — it will still reach any corner of Europe. But for some reason, they are placing it not far from Ukraine.

Although most of that "Yars" is just a pipe filled with gunpowder (solid rocket fuel), so even an FPV drone with a cumulative grenade is capable of turning a "Yars" into a "big bara-boom." And is it not too risky to transport nuclear charges from storage facilities to missile positions, when there might be saboteurs, ambushes, or mines along the way? Nevertheless, all this is being done contrary to logic and safety.

I find only one explanation for such a risk — the first preventive strike by the Russian Federation on Europe is planned to be launched precisely from our territory. Which will be immediately detected by the other side. And one local politician will not resist boasting about his nuclear prowess.

And then Western leaders will begin to discuss response options. Where to strike in retaliation - on the territory of the Russian Federation, which has 1400 strategic warheads, or to choose the safer option of striking the territory from which the missiles flew?

And they will have a great temptation, on which the Kremlin also relies, to choose the latter option. In accordance with the logic: "Of course, we feel sorry for Belarusians. But we can't start a world nuclear war. And they are already aggressors for the second time. And so we save face. Because we will respond, and we will not start a world war."

In Moscow, they will reason something like this: "Of course, we feel sorry for Belarusians. But they themselves want to be sovereign. Let them get the full sovereign program. At least our territory will remain intact."

Thus, our country is simply being used as bait for NATO strikes, to protect Russia from them.

NATO strikes, apparently, will be carried out with 500 kiloton thermonuclear warheads, and will be directed against the locations of nuclear munitions and their carriers. For example, at Osipovichi and Krichev, and also, possibly, at the rear and communications of Russian invasion groups in the Baltics, which are also on our territory. Half a megaton is a very serious charge — the shock wave, destruction zone, and fires will spread for hundreds of kilometers, almost all over Belarus the air will be contaminated with radioactive smoke from fires.

For example, the power of the nuclear charge detonated by the Americans over Hiroshima was 18 kilotons. About half a million Japanese died from the consequences of that explosion over several years. Will anything remain of Belarus and Belarusians if we receive several strikes of 500 kilotons? Today, the so-called "ordinary" Belarusians say: "At least we don't have war." How they might later envy Ukrainians, because ordinary, not nuclear, missiles fall on them, from which one can still hide.

Only we ourselves can stop this insane and deadly plan for us. Regardless of views and sources of income. And this is real. Because everyone has children, and the most terrible fate, which I wish on no one, is to watch a small person suffer from radiation sickness without the ability to save their life.

After a certain time, the radiation induced by thermonuclear explosions will dissipate. But in conditions of global warming, entire regions of the planet become uninhabitable. Therefore, our land will not lie fallow for long. Other peoples will settle it. And its new inhabitants will look with surprise and regret at the last dying aboriginals and wonder how they managed to lose such a blessed land.

I have no hope for this state. Because I remember how I once read in an official newspaper the answer to a Western journalist's question about how it happened that Russia attacked Ukraine from the territory of Belarus. The answer struck me with its sincerity: "We had exercises. Russian troops entered by one route, and could exit by different ones. Why Russian generals decided to withdraw them that way (through Ukraine), I don't know. They didn't tell me."

This "They didn't tell me" — it's not about dictatorship, not about democracy. It's not about a state at all. We will have to do everything ourselves. The necessary resources for this exist.

In conclusion

I won't hide it, I was uncomfortable offering you this text. Especially to those who rejoiced at my release, who congratulated Marina and me, and offered their help.

It was very important to us.

Thank you, people!

And now I paint such terrible prospects for you. This text was very difficult for me to write, taking a lot of moral, emotional, and even physical strength, supplies of which I don't have much of right now. But if there is even only one chance in ten that this horrific scenario is real for us — then that is already tremendously much. But, in my opinion, and I have reflected much on this topic, there are many more.

Therefore, I consider it my duty to warn you about it. I believe that every person has their purpose in life, from which they cannot deviate. Perhaps I was left alive and am now free only to warn you. Because forewarned is forearmed, they once said. You are warned. Let's think and act together to save Belarus, our loved ones, and the world.

We can do it. Belarus will live!

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