"There are no mistakes, there are lessons." Babaryka recounted how his scandalous interview with Vladimir Zolkin went

— Well, speaking of war, by the way: you, it turns out, almost immediately after your release plunged into the thick of events, at least, you and another group of similar political prisoners were taken to Ukraine, and from there you entered the territory of the European Union. When you were going to Ukraine, what were your thoughts? Because you probably knew for sure that there was a war, but you hardly understood all the details of this war, being in captivity.

— Well, in fact, I can say that details were hardly a difficulty. I clearly understood who the aggressor was, who the victim was, who was, in fact, the instigator of this war. I understood the justice of the war for Ukraine and the aggressiveness and imposition on the part of Russia.

I probably less expected to see the goodness and preserved humanity that was in Ukraine. Because to imagine that a country that is in a state of war accepts people, Belarusians, from whose side, no matter what, is a co-aggressor country, and accepts them without any ideological orientation, with kindness and surrounds them with care, despite its own problems. For me, this was a surprising and good discovery.

— As I understood from our conversation before the recording started, when our colleagues were setting everything up, were you surprised that this route ran through Ukraine?

— Yes, firstly, I was surprised to be released. Because, frankly, when we were taken to Ukraine... I opened my eyes and realized we were free only when a representative of the security services in Ukraine came in and said, "Good afternoon, welcome to free Ukraine." That is, it was the realization that we were in Ukraine at that very moment.

And yes, it was unexpected, because according to rumors that circulated in the colony where I was before, until December 2025, there were two countries that accepted political prisoners – Poland and Lithuania. And, accordingly, there was a feeling and understanding that if they were to be released, it would be precisely there.

And geographically, when we were being transported, I understood that we were being taken south. And for me, that meant it wasn't a release after all, but most likely just a transfer to yet another colony somewhere in the south, and by no means a release.

— So they didn't tell you anything?

— They didn't say anything, we were even driven with black bags over our heads for the first time, so we wouldn't even know where and how. And orientation by terrain occurred only exclusively during sanitary stops. By the stars and then by the sun, you understood that after all, we were probably not going west, but going south. [...]

— When political prisoners are released, any, Belarusian or Russian, especially if among the released are public opinion leaders, there is always great attention drawn to this. Accordingly, I remember when Sergei Tikhanovsky was released, he also gave us one of his first interviews, he came here, and there was great interest from viewers. When you were released with Maria Kalesnikava and other political prisoners, you gave an interview to Vladimir Zolkin in Ukraine, which caused such a resonance for some. Not everyone perceived it unequivocally. Don't you think it was a mistake to give an interview so hot on the heels?

— Let's start with the fact that, firstly, I always say that there are no mistakes, there are lessons. And this was a lesson for me. The lesson is actually very simple. In principle, you cannot give an interview in a situation where you enter a conditionally unfamiliar world for you, because for five and a half years, more than three of which were in complete incommunicado, you still enter a different world.

And not only that, this world was in a state of war. The fact that you left a tense situation and found yourself in a situation where there is a war that you do not feel in prison as people feel it, that is actually a lesson for me. Ideally, this should also be a lesson for journalists, if there is no goal to somehow compromise or get something provocative. So I can say that yes, it was a lesson that was impossible to learn.

— By the way, was there even a choice to give this interview?

— This was actually not an excuse here, but an explanation. For me, it looked like this: you find yourself in a country in a state of war, that is, we understand the state.

I didn't know I was going for an interview, I didn't know who Mr. Zolkin was. That is, employees, as I understand it, from the host side lead you, open the door, and say "we need to talk."

Well, that is, the law of hospitality and the understanding that this is needed not by you, but by the host side, obliges you to answer questions. That is, you understand that since this is the host side, you perceive it friendly. That is, since they are talking to you, it means the conversation is aimed exclusively at a friendly agenda. Well, logically, if the host side behaves this way. At least for me, it was logical.

And that's why I really answered questions unprepared, with a tonality that it would be a friendly conversation. And then something went wrong as intended, and so I had to take a neutral position.

— Well, the main thing is that lessons were learned and correct ones.

— Absolutely. That is, in this regard, yes.

— Next question. You probably… not "probably," but 100% have been asked about this many times. Frankly, I didn't really plan to, but colleagues from the editorial office asked. This is the famous question about Crimea. I'll just give a small preamble: you had different answers to this question at different periods, at least different formulations. What will be your answer now?

— Actually, mine are not different. Until December 14, 2025, my formulation was always the same. That is, I evaded answering this question twice and twice I dodged this answer. Maybe with different wording, but the tonality was so neutral, I didn't want to answer this question. This was one position.

After December 2025, the position was always exactly the same. Undoubtedly, Crimea, despite the fact that physically today it is captured, annexed by Russia, it always was and remains Ukrainian.

— In my work, I also have many Russian opposition figures on air. I want to understand people's motives: among a part of the Russian opposition, there are still people who cannot clearly say about Crimea that it is Ukrainian, or once said differently. I would like to understand their motives through you. Why couldn't it be clearly stated at certain periods then?

— Once again, from the point of view of why before the state of war, I, as a person who sought to work in the political field of Belarus, in 2020, before the war: the position of evading a direct answer, a neutral position, it was actually dictated by the interests of the country whose interests you represent.

In Belarus, no matter what we say, the situation until 2022, even after the harsh elections, we are quite closely economically connected with Russia. And any politician and any public figure who is going to do something in the interests of the people must focus on the interests of their own country and their own people. And therefore, until 2022, the policy was fully justified, it seems to me, at least my statements.

I am not ashamed of the statements in 2020, the attempt to avoid [the answer], because it was actually a difficult question for the attitude of Belarusians themselves to this situation.

After 2022, it is very difficult for me to answer for Russian politicians and oppositionists, although, probably, they are guided by the same logic. That is, I am not sure, I do not know the mood of Russians, but I am not sure that the majority of Russians or all Russians are against the war. Their attitude towards Crimea can be complex. And there may be an attempt to find some compromise and that gives these people, including oppositionists, the need to somehow evade this question.

The situation in Belarus is different. In Belarus today, it seems to me, there is clearly an understanding that we should not be directly involved in this war. And, accordingly, we must clearly define our attitude towards this war.

That is, here it is necessary to divide the regime and the people. That is, I, for example, believe that any person who now defines their position on Crimea must take into account the interests of their people. And the interests of their people, as I understand it, are unequivocal for Belarusians. We must not be directly involved in this war.

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