"Trouble, unfortunately, is already stepping on the threshold of the Blue-Eyed Land." Zelensky's ultimatum to Lukashenka: what's next?

Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. Photo: Mikhail Metzel, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP; AP

Ukraine's ultimatum demand that Belarus stop adjusting the routes of Russian drones within a week came after Volodymyr Zelensky's return from a meeting with G-7 leaders, after Ukraine's strike on an oil refinery near Moscow, and after the ultimatum of European states to Moscow, delivered to Sergey Lavrov by the ambassadors of France, Germany, and Britain on June 7.

The full content of the European ultimatum to Moscow has not yet been disclosed in the media. The fact that the Russian diplomatic department has not done so indicates the seriousness of the declared. Apparently, Moscow was offered to agree to a ceasefire, otherwise Western countries would lift restrictions on Ukrainian strikes deep into Russian territory. It should be noted that in a military sense, Belarus is practically part of Russia — both technically and ideologically.

Volodymyr Zelensky's ultimatum to Lukashenka has been voiced publicly. On the one hand, it is firm: Minsk has not been spoken to like this before. On the other hand, it is quite unspecific — which leaves room for interpretation.

Aliaksandr Lukashenka, who usually does not restrain his words towards anyone who contradicts him, is not rushing in this case. So far, there is no personal reaction from him.

Belarusian propaganda, in turn, has returned to calling Ukrainians "Banderites" and "Ukronazis."

The first reaction from the propaganda apparatus at various levels was nuclear blackmail.

"The most important thing in this situation is an immediate response to the attack with all forces and means, including nuclear weapons," wrote yesterday MP of the House of Representatives Aliaksandr Shpakouski. "This will be a real test of our allied agreements. This position should be conveyed not so much to the drug addict (this is how he politely and according to the Russian propaganda template calls Volodymyr Zelensky — NN), but to the countries of Europe and the USA."

Any use of nuclear weapons would provoke a devastating retaliatory strike — first with conventional, and if necessary, with nuclear weapons, after which Belarus, as we know it, would simply cease to exist. The possibility of the war escalating into a nuclear one troubled Western intelligence in 2022-2023; now analysts consider such a development unlikely, as limited defeats on the front do not pose a threat to the Russian regime.

Another possible consequence of kinetic strikes on Belarusian territory concerns analyst Yury Drakakhrust — the introduction of even more Russian troops into Belarus and the further erosion of the country's sovereignty.

"There's a legal aspect here — is the placement of repeaters, which have been there for quite some time, a legal basis for military actions to neutralize them? But a much more important political aspect is another theater of military operations on the border of two more NATO countries, a flow of refugees, a blow to trade logistics with China, and much more, even if one doesn't consider Belarusian war casualties," Yury Drakakhrust writes on his social networks. "And there's another important question for Europe and the USA — who will govern Belarus, which is drawn into the war? Lukashenka? Tsikhanouskaya? Or perhaps Putin? And not in the way he already influences much in Belarus, but like an occupied, say, Luhansk Oblast of Ukraine. Directly, including exercising civilian administration. Are Ukrainian missiles and drones, along with the Kalinouski Regiment, capable of preventing this? It's not excluded that European capitals will not be so confident in this," Yury Drakakhrust believes.

"Perhaps, as a result, the repeaters will even be removed," he allows. "But if not, if diplomacy fails, within a week a gate to hell may open for Belarus," writes Yury Drakakhrust.

The same concern is expressed on his social networks by another journalist from Radio "Svaboda" (Liberty), Dzmitry Hurnievich: "If Ukraine strikes military targets on Belarusian territory within a week, it will violate the status quo that has existed for five years concerning Belarus. Then Putin will get an 'excuse' to 'defend Belarus.' What could start then, it's better for no one to even imagine. Belarusian politicians must now stand on their heads to prevent this from happening, and not take the position of a school fight, where some prolong the fight, and others distract them, because fighting is fun. 'Anything but war,' strangely enough, is a very sensible slogan now," Hurnievich writes.

"Ukraine did not appeal to the UN Security Council, did not present any evidence of an imminent threat from Belarus, and did not even conduct informal consultations with Security Council members on this issue," criticizes Zelensky an oppositionist to the opposition, former Belarusian diplomat Valer Kavaleuski. "One can conclude that no evidence of a real military threat from Belarus to Ukraine was presented. Kyiv's ultimatum appears to be a sharp raising of stakes without evidence of a new threat and without calculating consequences even one step ahead. As a result, Ukraine, and with it the EU countries, may lose more than gain if the conflict escalates into a regional one," Kavaleuski writes on his Facebook page.

He calls the prospects for Belarus in this scenario "catastrophic."

"The escalation began in 2022 from the side of the Russian and Belarusian authorities. It's just that back then Ukraine did not have the capabilities to respond to this escalation as the situation demanded. Times have changed, now Ukraine can do it and loudly states that the conditions it was forced to accept in 2022 in relations with Belarus do not suit it. They didn't suit it before either, but it simply couldn't do anything about it. And now, apparently, it believes it can. And it proposes to return the situation to the state before 2022, that is, to the initial escalation. The chosen form (ultimatum), of course, does not contribute to achieving this goal. Just as extending military actions to the territory of Belarus is unlikely to serve Ukraine's interests. But something needs to be done with Russia's military infrastructure in Belarus, doesn't it? Ukraine clearly doesn't like to watch it being used to kill its citizens. So, perhaps, the Belarusian authorities shouldn't want to put their citizens at such risk either? And they should stop helping Russia kill Ukrainians?" — another former Belarusian diplomat, Pavel Slyunkin, responded to Kavaleuski.

"Yes, now a Banderite attack on our country is more real than ever. Therefore, our only response is to rally around the President and be ready to defend the country. All who are against are enemies," writes propagandist Aliaksei Dziermant.

His channel "Chyrvonaya Skifiya" (Red Scythia) calls to believe in Aliaksandr Lukashenka: "No one else but this true RUSSIAN man cares better for his country, and no one understands the price of peace better than the President of Belarus. And Russia has no more reliable ally than this man. And now, when trouble, unfortunately, is already stepping on the threshold of the Blue-Eyed Land, only this man will save and protect," Dziermant dramatically writes.

What is Ukraine's military potential and how can Belarus respond?

And what can be said about the means of implementing the threats?

It is unlikely that Ukraine has any accumulated reserve of weapons that it has not used against Belarus, but could use against Russia. This means that Kyiv could extend to Belarus attacks of the type that are inflicted on targets deep within the Russian Federation.

Primarily, this refers to pinpoint drone strikes against Belarusian communication towers in southern Polesia. Ukraine has long waged a similar fight along the entire front line.

Any larger-scale attacks would create risks of more extensive retaliatory strikes.

In turn, systematic attacks on the Russian oil and gas sector aim to convey to the Russian population, brainwashed by chauvinistic propaganda, that the war is close and that Putin is not winning. At some point, to achieve this goal, Kyiv and its allies may consider it necessary to cut off Belarusian oil refineries as well — if they become a lifeline for fueling the European part of Russia.

It is unlikely that Minsk has a greater air defense density than Russia itself, and a large stock of air defense ammunition in conditions where Russia itself, judging by many signs, has begun to experience a deficit of it. This means that repelling Ukrainian drone attacks would be challenging for the Belarusian army. However, F-16 strikes on targets covered by Belarusian S-300s and "Pantsirs" are unlikely to be feasible — unless the Belarusian sky is left exposed to cover the Russian one.

As for the possibility of a ground operation, this scenario is risky. It is unlikely to be relevant at this stage, although defending territories south of Pripyat is logistically difficult. Belarusian authorities have also modernized bridges across the large Polesian river in Mazyr and Zhytkavichy. The construction of another bridge, between Luninets and Stolin districts, is planned.

A dangerous scenario for Ukraine would be the resumption of missile and drone strikes on northern Ukraine from Belarusian territory, as occurred in 2022. Their flight time is short; in the event of such a response, Ukraine would be forced to consider intensive, rather than pinpoint, operations on Belarusian territory.

The very tone with which Kyiv now speaks to Moscow's Minsk proxies shows how the balance of power in the region has shifted. Belarus remains in a position of total support for Russia. Probably, if Minsk had adopted a neutral stance and normalized relations with EU countries, such conversations would not be happening and threats would not be voiced.

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