What Aliaksei Frantskevich is silent about, to whom Poland banned entry for 10 years
Aliaksei Frantskevich, head of the public association "Belarusian Community of Ukraine," claims leadership in the Belarusian diaspora in Ukraine. However, when he was traveling from Ukraine to Warsaw, Polish border guards removed him from the train and informed him that he was banned from entering Poland. What suspicions might Polish special services have about Frantskevich, and why does his past raise questions? When "Nasha Niva" looked into available databases, our eyes popped out: two convictions and border crossing data that do not match his statements. Then we also spoke with people who knew him.
On August 7, 2026, Aliaksei Frantskevich was traveling to Warsaw for the "New Belarus" conference. He did not cross the border. According to him, Polish border guards informed him of a ten-year entry ban, and later, that he was considered an "undesirable person."
Polish agencies do not publicly disclose the specific reasons in such situations.
"We hope for a transparent and fair consideration of the situation, as well as for the observance of the principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights," stated the charitable foundation headed by Frantskevich.
This ban became an occasion to carefully examine Aliaksei Frantskevich's past and raised the pertinent question: who is this man who for many years presented himself as a Belarusian activist, moved among Belarusian volunteers, and demanded that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya enter into a "real dialogue" with Belarusians in Ukraine.
"Nasha Niva" reconstructed his biography using registries, archival publications, and testimonies from people who knew him in Belarus, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine.
Frantskevich's public biography turned out to have many gray areas. Before receiving political asylum in the Czech Republic, he had no known history of opposition activity, but he was twice convicted of property crimes. In emigration, he registered companies and organizations, engaged in legalizing other people, and cooperated with Volha Karach and Ales Michalevich.
Later in Ukraine, he headed a foundation created even before his departure from Belarus. Together with Volha Karach, Anatol Kotau, and Dzmitry Skindzerau, he joined the political forum of Dzmitry Balkunets and Valery Tsapkala, created in opposition to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. And he helped the "Terror" battalion, which had split from the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment.
Five years with confiscation, a new theft — and political asylum. What Frantskevich did before leaving for the Czech Republic
Aliaksei Frantskevich was born on March 14, 1975, in Maladziechna. In his public biography, his adult life supposedly begins only in 2006 — with his departure to the Czech Republic and obtaining political asylum. However, earlier information is preserved in Belarusian registries. In 1999, Frantskevich registered in Maladziechna as an individual entrepreneur. This IE was excluded from the registry in 2002. In November 2004, he opened a second IE, but in April 2006, it was liquidated: according to the official wording, the entrepreneur had not carried out any activity for twelve months. What exactly Frantskevich did and whether his business had real turnover is unclear from open data.
A month before the 2006 presidential elections — when there were only a handful of political prisoners in Belarus, all of whom were top opposition figures — Frantskevich left Belarus, went to the Czech Republic, and obtained refugee status there.
Later in interviews, Frantskevich would call himself a Belarusian activist, talk about the Lukashenka regime and political prisoners. However, in available archives from the pre-Czech period, his name does not appear in a political context at all.
Frantskevich is not among the participants in election campaigns, observers, those detained at protests, distributors of independent press, or heroes of human rights chronicles. Independent media did not write about him, nor was he mentioned in reports on repression.
People who were involved in the democratic movement in the mid-1990s and first half of the 2000s also do not remember Frantskevich as a political activist.
However, he appears in police databases long before 2006, and in a completely different capacity. Frantskevich was convicted twice. Both times — for property crimes.
Frantskevich's first conviction: five years and confiscation
The first time Frantskevich found himself in the dock was in 1995. On March 17, just three days after his twentieth birthday,
the court of Maladziechna district sentenced him to five years of imprisonment with confiscation of property.
Initially, Frantskevich's actions were qualified under Article 91¹ in conjunction with Article 42 of the Criminal Code of 1960. Article 91¹ provided for liability for theft of state or public property on a large scale. Article 42 allowed the court, taking into account exceptional circumstances of the case and the personality of the offender, to impose a penalty lower than the minimum provided by law. Thus, the five years received by Frantskevich was a significantly mitigated punishment.
Frantskevich served his sentence in penal colony No. 8 in Orsha. Later he was transferred to penal colony No. 24 in Rechytsa district. The latter institution has been preserved but has changed its profile and is now known as correctional colony No. 24 in Zarechye — a women's colony for recidivists.
On October 27, 1998, the Rechytsa District Court conditionally released Frantskevich on parole. He had almost a year left until the end of his term. Thus, of the five years sentenced, he served about four.
Second case: car stereo theft
The next criminal episode occurred approximately six and a half years after his release. On May 16, 2005, the Maladziechna District Court found Frantskevich guilty under Part 1 of Article 205 of the new Criminal Code.
According to case materials, on March 12, 2005, Frantskevich stole a car stereo from a "Renault" vehicle belonging to a certain A. Yevseev. For this, he received one year of corrective labor with 15% of his earnings withheld in favor of the state.
Thus, by early 2006, his confirmed biography looked as follows: a serious property crime in his youth, five years with confiscation, several years in penal colonies, conditional early release, followed by a new theft and one year of corrective labor. No known political persecution is present in this chronology.
Nevertheless, almost immediately after the second conviction, Frantskevich became a political refugee.
First departure a month before the elections
Frantskevich himself, in his later interviews, speaks very briefly about this turn of events. According to him, in 2006, he left for the Czech Republic a month before the presidential elections and obtained refugee status there. The elections were held on March 19, so it must refer to approximately February — less than a year after his second conviction.
In a long interview in 2024, where Frantskevich spoke in detail about repression in Belarus, political prisoners, and his further path, there is almost no mention of the reasons for his first departure: only the date, the Czech Republic, and the status obtained. There is no story about detentions, beatings, searches, dismissal for political reasons, membership in an opposition organization, participation in an election campaign, or threats from the KGB.
Against this background, it is interesting what story Frantskevich told the Czech migration and other authorities, and whether he reported both of his convictions.
This is not a minor detail. The Czech asylum law stipulated that protection is not granted to a person for whom there are serious grounds to believe that before arrival, they committed a serious non-political crime outside the Czech Republic.
Such a norm also derived from the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. However, not every conviction automatically closes the path to asylum: authorities must assess the nature and severity of the crime, the circumstances of the case, and the role of the individual.
Why the Czech Republic accepted Belarusians
In the mid-2000s, political asylum was one of the ways for Belarusians to legalize their stay in the European Union. In emigration circles, such people were ironically called "uprchlíky" — from the Czech uprchlík, "refugee." Far from every application was backed by real political persecution: some tailored their biographies to fit the desired story to settle in the country.
The Czech Republic indeed treated Belarusians more favorably than most other applicants. In 2006, when Frantskevich arrived there, 66 Belarusian citizens received asylum — almost a quarter of all 268 people to whom the Czech Republic granted protection that year. Belarusians submitted 174 applications and ranked first in the number of positive decisions.
From 1990 to mid-2007, 2024 Belarusians applied for asylum, and 286 received it. Thus, about 14% of applications were positive — compared to an overall rate of 3.8% for foreigners. According to a study by Charles University, Belarusians ranked fourth among national groups by the number of granted asylums. Czech authorities took into account the increase in repression in Belarus before and after the 2006 presidential elections. An official Czech overview for 2005 noted that asylum based on persecution was most often granted to citizens of Belarus, as well as Uzbekistan.
In Frantskevich's case, we found no public trace of political persecution, not even a minimal one. The first political episode we managed to confirm in Frantskevich's biography occurred not in Belarus, but in the Czech Republic — several years after obtaining asylum. It was there that a person with a criminal past and no visible opposition experience began to transform into a Belarusian public activist. And along with politics, another occupation appeared in his life — registering organizations and solving issues related to the legalization of other people.
How Frantskevich acquired a business, an organization, and a political biography in the Czech Republic
Czech legalization gave Aliaksei Frantskevich what many other immigrants from post-Soviet countries lacked: a legal right to live in the European Union, an official address, and the ability to register companies in his name.
A Belarusian in the Czech Republic, who has lived there since the beginning of the century and intersected with Frantskevich, told "Nasha Niva" that he earned money in the Czech Republic by opening businesses and selling them.
Such people are sometimes called "openers" (or "strawmen" in a negative sense). He registers companies in his name, formalizes the necessary documents, and then sells the ready-made legal entity to the actual client. The sale of so-called ready-made, or "shelf," companies is not prohibited in the Czech Republic. It is a separate market for services: the client does not have to wait for registration, look for a legal address, and go through initial bureaucracy. They pay and receive an already established company suitable for doing business.
However, such a model also has a gray area. Especially when clients need not so much a company as a person with legal status, in whose name it can initially be registered. If the scheme works correctly, after several years it is already impossible to find the original registrar by the company name: the registry already lists different owners and directors.
The Czech Belarusian says that this brought Frantskevich his main income for a long time. In fact, his Czech status turned into a commercial resource. For a person without legalization, opening a company, getting an address, dealing with a bank and accounting was difficult. Frantskevich already had the necessary documents and could offer the entire package.
Frantskevich, according to our interlocutor, also took on issues related to the legalization of foreigners and obtaining Czech residence permits. In such schemes, a company could be an instrument. The firm created a formal basis for business activities, employment, or document processing.
Frantskevich's political biography also emerged in the Czech Republic.
Asociace pro modernizaci on Revoluční Street
In March 2011, former Belarusian presidential candidate Ales Michalevich arrived in the Czech Republic. Unlike Frantskevich, Michalevich had a clear reason to seek protection: after the 2010 elections, he was arrested on charges of mass riots, and after his release, he spoke about torture in the KGB pre-trial detention center. Soon, the Czech Republic granted him political asylum.
Seven months later, on October 24, 2011, Asociace pro modernizaci — "Association for Modernization" — was registered in Prague. Information about the organization is preserved in the Czech registry of legal entities.
Frantskevich's cooperation with Michalevich began almost immediately after Michalevich's move to Prague. The Association was established in October 2011, and already in 2012, both publicly represented it.
In December 2012, Czech Radio called Michalevich the chairman of the "Association for Modernization." In other publications, Frantskevich was referred to as the chairman or head of the organization. The organization gave him what he previously lacked: official status as a Belarusian public and political figure. Now he could speak to journalists as an organizer and head of a Belarusian structure registered in Prague. This transformation occurred approximately five to six years after living in the Czech Republic.
From ready-made firms to a ready-made political platform
The "Association for Modernization" was not exclusively a paper organization. It did indeed hold actions, disseminate statements, and contact Czech state and public structures.
In May 2012, about twenty Belarusians came to the Škoda Auto building in Mladá Boleslav. They demanded that the company not support the 2014 World Ice Hockey Championship in Minsk, as sponsorship, in their opinion, helped legitimize the Lukashenka regime. Frantskevich acted as the organizer of the action and handed a letter and a petition with fifty signatures to company representatives. This was reported by Česká televize and Český rozhlas.
In November 2012, Frantskevich participated in a meeting of representatives of six Belarusian organizations registered in the Czech Republic with the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the human rights organization People in Need. The meeting discussed the idea of creating a Belarusian House in Prague. Frantskevich proposed holding a large street protest on December 19 in Old Town Square — on the anniversary of the crackdown on protests after the 2010 presidential elections.
In May 2013, the association announced the campaign "Do not let criminals into Europe," opposing the possible invitations of Uladzimir Makei and Aliaksandr Lukashenka to EU countries. Frantskevich again spoke on behalf of the organization.
The scale of this activity should not be exaggerated. Dozens of people participated in actions, not thousands, and the petition against Škoda had about fifty signatures. However, for Frantskevich's personal biography, the effect was significant. The registered structure provided a name, a position, contacts with media, and the opportunity to attend meetings with Czech officials and international organizations. Thus, in a few years, Frantskevich transformed into a "chairman of the association," a "public activist," and a representative of the Belarusian diaspora.
It was during the Czech period that Volha Karach and her organization "Nash Dom" (Our House) also appeared in Frantskevich's biography. They publicly cooperated from at least 2012.
In November 2012, Karach and Frantskevich participated in a joint meeting of six Belarusian organizations in Prague. Karach represented "Nash Dom," and Frantskevich — the "Association for Modernization." Among the participants were also representatives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the human rights organization People in Need. At the meeting, Frantskevich proposed holding a large street protest on December 19 on the anniversary of the crackdown on protests after the 2010 elections.
Such an action indeed took place on Old Town Square. About twenty people came to the rally in support of Belarusian political prisoners.
On November 23, 2013, Karach and Frantskevich again took part in a joint meeting of representatives of the Belarusian emigration. The meeting was held via Skype. Michalevich and Frantskevich represented the "Association for Modernization," Karach — "Nash Dom." Participants discussed coordinating the informing of the world community about the situation in Belarus and preparing simultaneous actions in various countries. Frantskevich acted as the coordinator of the planned worldwide action.
It should be noted that "Nasha Niva" reached out to Ales Michalevich to ask about his joint history with Frantskevich. Did he know about his past or not? What did he note for himself as a result of communicating with him? However, Michalevich did not want to speak with us.
The Czech organization faded, but was still needed
The "Association for Modernization" in the Czech Republic actually wound down its Belarusian activities in the mid-2010s.
The Czech government's report on the situation of national minorities for 2016 stated that the activity of Asociace pro modernizaci was limited to maintaining a Facebook page. In the 2017 report, the association was already listed among Belarusian organizations that conducted no activity. But legally, the association continued to exist, and its name could be used for participation in international projects.
The "Association for Modernization" existed in the registry much longer than its active public activity. The process of closing the organization began in 2024. The liquidation stretched for almost two years: only on June 15, 2026, was the association finally excluded from the registry.
In 2017, this almost inactive Belarusian organization unexpectedly entered a completely different geographical area.
From Belarusian activist — to expert on Armenia
During this same period, Frantskevich continued to speak abroad on behalf of the Czech "Association for Modernization" and suddenly transformed into a "European expert" on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and nuclear safety.
On May 30, 2017, Frantskevich, on behalf of the "Association for Modernization," announced his accession to the "Civil Platform for Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan." The announcement was disseminated mainly by Azerbaijani media and the platform's own press service.
Formally, the initiative was supposed to facilitate the peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict and build dialogue between the societies of the two countries. In practice, its public statements were clearly closer to Baku's position, and informational support was provided by Azerbaijani state and pro-government publications.
At that time, Azerbaijan generously showered petrodollars on those willing to create a positive image for the country.
In October 2017, Haqqin.az presented Frantskevich not just as a Belarusian activist, but as a "well-known European expert" and chairman of an organization registered in Prague. He spoke about the "mission of Belarusian experts" in Armenia and the report they prepared on the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant. According to Frantskevich, the mission participants did not get to the NPP itself, but spoke with local residents and Armenian experts, asked people about their health, and on this basis prepared a "substantive and convincing" report. The article had a characteristic title — "Lukashenka's Partisans Cover Nuclear Facility in Armenia."
In January 2018, Frantskevich was approved as a member of the Central Control and Auditing Commission of the Armenian-Azerbaijani "Peace Platform." This was reported by 1news.az and other Azerbaijani publications.
Thus, Frantskevich's most notable public activity in 2017-2018 was not related to Belarusian politics in Minsk, but to an international project that broadcast theses favorable to Ilham Aliyev's authoritarian regime. The Prague-registered association, which was already almost inactive in the Czech Republic itself, allowed him to appear in a new status — as a representative of European civil society.
Return without persecution: what Frantskevich did in Belarus
In Aliaksei Frantskevich's public biography, his return to Belarus sounds like a principled political step. Supposedly, he waited many years for the regime to release political prisoners, and after Mikalai Statkevich's release, he decided: the condition was met, he could go.
On August 22, 2015, Aliaksandr Lukashenka pardoned six political prisoners, including Mikalai Statkevich. At that moment, official Minsk was trying to restore relations with the European Union and create an impression of political thaw before the presidential elections.
Ales Michalevich seized the moment and took a bold step. On September 8, 2015, he boarded a train from Vilnius to Minsk. Frantskevich accompanied him to the Belarusian border. After crossing the border, Frantskevich remained in telephone contact with Michalevich and essentially became his contact person for journalists. Policemen from Minsk met Michalevich in Hudahay. A few hours later, the politician was released on recognizance not to leave.
From Frantskevich's interviews, it might seem that he also went to Belarus as soon as such an opportunity arose. But everything was completely different.
As follows from the database of Belarusian border crossings, the first time Frantskevich arrived after his long departure was only in 2018 — by train from Vilnius. His arrival in Belarus led neither to detention nor to a ban on leaving the country.
Then he started coming to Belarus more often — four times in 2019. In the absolute majority of cases, these were trips from Ukraine to Belarus and back.
Frantskevich had a Belarusian passport, but at the same time, he had a Czech permanent residence permit, which a person usually receives after a certain number of years living in the country.
Therefore, he could effectively live between several countries — primarily the Czech Republic and Ukraine, but sometimes also visit Belarus.
In open sources, no traces of Frantskevich's political, public, or entrepreneurial activity in Belarus in 2018-2020 remain. His name is not found in available archives of independent media, nor in human rights chronicles, nor in reports of opposition organizations.
Pandemic brought him back to Belarus
According to Frantskevich's own account, it was not politics but the coronavirus that forced him to stay in Belarus for longer in 2020.
Czech authorities introduced strict quarantine restrictions. In Belarus, Lukashenka denied the seriousness of the pandemic, did not close the country, and advised treating it with baths, vodka, and work in the field. Frantskevich chose Belarus.
Later he would present himself as an activist who left the country after the dramatic events of 2020. However, the history of border crossings here also shows a different picture.
Frantskevich spent three months in Belarus — from early March 2020 to mid-June 2020. At that time, a presidential campaign was beginning in the country, but there was no visible involvement of Frantskevich in it. We did not find him among members of initiative groups, organizers of pickets, independent observers, or representatives of alternative candidates' headquarters.
According to Belpol data, on June 17, 2020, Frantskevich left Belarus for Ukraine. He crossed the border in a private Volkswagen car with Ukrainian license plates. The next recorded entry into Belarus occurred only on August 25 — from the territory of Poland, also by car.
Thus, Frantskevich was not in Belarus on August 9, when the presidential elections took place and mass arrests began. He was not there in the following days either, when Belarusians gathered near the Akrestsina detention center, strike committees were created at enterprises, and the first two mass Sunday demonstrations took place across the country — on August 16 and 23.
Frantskevich massively posted other people's photos and videos from protests, as well as someone else's amateur photos from protests in his native Maladziechna, on his Facebook feed — it might have seemed like his own, but it wasn't.
He returned to Belarus only on August 25, sixteen days after the elections. His stay in the country was short. Already on August 31, Frantskevich again left Belarus — this time by plane to Lviv. Thus, after returning from Poland, he spent less than a week in Belarus.
Later, Frantskevich recounted that he decided to leave after an anonymous warning. "I received a call and was told: you have two days, because you will be put on the no-fly list," he recalled.
This explanation sounds unbelievable: there were no other such confirmed cases.
Thus, on August 31, Frantskevich once again found himself in Ukraine. Later, his departure would be described as forced emigration due to repression. But only his own story about an unknown person who warned him in advance about the "no-fly list" is documented. In open sources, there is no information about a criminal case initiated against him at that time, a summons for interrogation, a search, or an administrative protocol.
Similar cases come to mind. Anzhalika Melnikava left Belarus on September 3, 2020. Together with her husband, they went to Kyiv. And Volha Siamashka, wife of a "Wargaming" employee who had a cover passport, — on September 7, 2020, also by plane to Kyiv. Both the first and the second claimed that they were threatened with repression — but there are no facts supporting this.
The question remains, which Frantskevich nowhere explains: for what exactly did the authorities supposedly intend to make him a persona non grata, if during the previous five years he showed almost no political activity in Belarus, and during the protests he was not in the country at all?
Frantskevich arrived in Lviv with a Belarusian passport, a Czech permanent residence permit, experience in registering organizations, and a wide network of contacts. A few months later, he would head the Belarusian crisis center in Ukraine.
Lviv: refugee aid, family foundation. And people with weapons
When Frantskevich flew to Ukraine, a ready-made legal entity was already waiting for him there. According to the Ukrainian registry, the charitable organization "International Volunteer Fund 'Nash Dom'" was registered in Lviv on February 17, 2020 — half a year before Frantskevich's departure from Belarus. He himself became the head of the fund from the moment of registration. This indicates that Ukraine was not a random destination for Frantskevich: a legal structure already existed in advance, as did people capable of registering it, and, apparently, plans for further work.
The name of the Lviv fund also seems not accidental. "Nash Dom" (Our House) is the name of Volha Karach's organization, with which Frantskevich cooperated even during the Czech period. By the time the Ukrainian fund was registered, they had known each other for at least seven years. The old contact information for the Lviv structure also featured an email on Karach's organization's domain.
In January 2021, the Belarusian Crisis Center began operating on the basis of the fund. It helped people who left Belarus for Ukraine after the August protests or used Lviv as a transit point on their way to the European Union.
Frantskevich claimed that housing and work were sought for refugees, and they were assisted with documents, humanitarian visas, and legalization. According to him, requests for help came from Lviv, Kyiv, Dnipro, Poltava, Chernihiv, Poland, and Belarus itself.
Media outlets, including international ones, began to actively write about Frantskevich.
He claimed that the center legalized even those who entered Ukraine illegally, helped obtain humanitarian visas, and travel further.
In Lviv, a Belarusian Sunday school and weekly solidarity actions appeared. On Freedom Day in 2021, Frantskevich unfurled a white-red-white flag on the Lviv city hall.
Frantskevich's role in Ukraine remained unchanged: he again became an intermediary through whom people, documents, and contacts with government agencies passed. And sensitive personal information.
Wife among founders, daughter in Lviv
Currently, the Fund's registry lists three founders: Belarusian citizen Aliaksei Frantskevich, Ukrainian citizen Tamara Alehauna Frantskevich, and Tajik citizen Katsiaryna Shoziyauva Nazarshoeva. The history of changes in the registry shows that Tamara Alehauna Zazuk was previously among the founders, who was later replaced by Tamara Alehauna Frantskevich. This may indicate a change of surname after marriage to Aliaksei Frantskevich.
The couple has a young daughter. In an interview published in September 2024, Frantskevich said that the girl was three years old. His wife and child remained with him in Lviv. Only during the period when the city lost electricity and heating did he briefly take them to a safer place, after which the family returned.
Tajik citizen Katsiaryna Nazarshoeva remains an almost non-public figure in this structure. In open databases, her name is primarily associated with this fund.
From "Nash Dom" to "Vilna Belarus"
After the start of the full-scale war, the fund's profile changed. It began to help Ukrainian displaced persons, military units, and Belarusian volunteers.
On October 31, 2022, the "International Volunteer Fund 'Nash Dom'" was officially renamed the charitable fund "Vilna Belarus" (Free Belarus). The legal entity and its code remained the same.
The fund provided medicines and equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, helped families of fallen Belarusian volunteers. In 2023, the creation of another structure with a loud name — the Belarusian Center for National Memory — was announced on its basis. The center intended to cooperate with the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory and universities, research the participation of Belarusians in the defense of Ukraine, and support the families of volunteers.
In September 2024, the Belarusian House opened on Kleparivska Street in Lviv. It housed a museum and the exhibition "Vilna Belarus with Ukraine in its Heart" — 24 stands with stories of Belarusians who died defending Ukraine.
Frantskevich lobbied for the renaming of Ukrainian streets in honor of fallen Belarusians and initiated a petition to award the title of Hero of Ukraine to volunteer Dzmitry Rubasheuski. The exhibition about Belarusian warriors was taken to Ukrainian cities.
Simultaneously with the activities of the Ukrainian fund, Frantskevich created another organization — this time in the Czech Republic.
"God Protect Ukraine": an organization with zero income and expenses
On December 15, 2022, an inaugural meeting of the association Bůh ochraňuj Ukrajinu z.s. — "God Protect Ukraine" — took place in Prague. Three people participated in the meeting: Aliaksei Frantskevich, Ilona Zazuk (the same surname as Frantskevich's wife), and Tamara Frantskevich. All three joined the board, and Frantskevich was elected chairman. The organization was officially registered on January 12, 2023, at the Prague City Court. Frantskevich received the right to represent it solely, assume legal obligations on its behalf, and sign documents. He was also to open a bank account and manage it independently.
The stated goals appeared ambitious. The organization intended to unite people helping children, adults, the elderly, and other victims of Russian aggression. The charter spoke of collecting and distributing resources, social rehabilitation of war victims, international cooperation, and consulting activities.
The loud name and humanitarian goals remained on paper. The financial report of "God Protect Ukraine" for 2023 shows no donations, membership fees, or expenses for aiding war victims. Cash in hand and bank accounts are listed as zero. For the next two years, no reports are available in the Czech registry, and outside it, the organization has left almost no public trace. Therefore, it is impossible to confirm from open documents that it actually carried out the declared humanitarian activities.
The legal address of the organization is listed as Legerova 356/48 in Prague. This is an address for mass registration: currently, more than three dozen companies and organizations have their legal domicile there, and previously several dozen more were registered.
The list of Frantskevich's new structures did not end with the Czech association. On April 29, 2025, he registered another legal entity in Ukraine — the public union "Belarusian Community of Ukraine." Its address coincides with the address of the Belarusian House in Lviv.
"Vilna Belarus" budget is meager
According to OpenDataBot, in 2023, the income of "Vilna Belarus" amounted to 33,400 hryvnias, in 2024 — 21,700, in 2025 — 17,900 — which is about $400. The number of official employees in all these years is zero. The fund's assets decreased from 31,100 hryvnias to 3,700.
The organization reported supplying military personnel, supporting dozens of families, assisting refugees, exhibitions in various cities, and its own venue in the center of Lviv. These figures do not necessarily reflect the full volume of aid: medicines and equipment could have been received in kind, and individual expenses could have been paid directly by partners.
The fact that the official annual income is several hundred dollars appears extremely small.
Judging by the photos in the "Vilna Belarus" Telegram channel, Frantskevich travels quite a lot around Ukraine.
Balkunets' Forum: in one council with Karach and Tsapkala
Simultaneously with his Ukrainian volunteer activities, Frantskevich entered open politics.
In 2022, he joined the Forum of Democratic Forces, which gathered around political scientist Dzmitry Balkunets, Volha Karach, Vieranika and Valery Tsapkala. At the second forum in Berlin, Frantskevich was elected to the temporary National Council of United Democratic Forces.
His name stands in the final resolution of the forum next to the names of Balkunets, Karach, and Vieranika Tsapkala. The forum proposed creating its own National Council and holding elections to an alternative Belarusian parliament.
Thus, Frantskevich found himself in a political project that positioned itself as an alternative to the main structures of the Belarusian democratic opposition. His public claims against Tsikhanouskaya's Office fully corresponded to the line of this environment.
Aid to "Terror"
Another area of Frantskevich's activity is aiding the Belarusian unit "Terror."
"Terror" emerged as part of the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment and was named in honor of Zmitser Apanasovich, who died after being wounded in battles for Irpin. "Terror" was his call sign. In August 2022, after the dismissal of the commander with the call sign "Varah," a part of the fighters left the regiment and retained the unit's name. In December of the same year, "Terror" joined the Belarusian Volunteer Corps.
Frantskevich's Lviv structure openly supported "Terror" after it left the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment.
According to preserved Telegram channel messages, in autumn 2022, the fund supplied the unit with tactical first-aid kits, bandaging materials, tourniquets, tactical headphones, trench candles, and field showers. Later, a separate publication appeared on the project's website about the transfer of tourniquets to "Terror" fighters.
But two years later, the name "Terror" appeared in materials of a Polish case regarding sabotage in Poland on behalf of foreign intelligence.
In May 2024, the Polish Internal Security Agency detained Kamil K. alias "Korek," Belarusians Andrei B. and Stsiapan K. According to an investigation by Gazeta Wyborcza, which was retold by InfoSecurity24, in 2022 all three served in the Belarusian unit "Terror."
In August 2025, the National Public Prosecutor's Office of Poland submitted a case against six people to court. Among other things, the prosecutor's office charges Kamil, Andrei, and Stsiapan with setting fire to a restaurant in Gdynia, attempting to set fire to a warehouse in Gdańsk, and setting fire to a pallet storage area in Marki. The last two episodes are called acts of sabotage commissioned by foreign intelligence. Kamil pleaded guilty to the charges. Andrei partially admitted them. Stsiapan denied guilt.
One of our interlocutors believes that supporting the unit could have influenced Poland's decision to ban Frantskevich from entering the country. For Polish services, a person who had contacts with a closed military environment, provided aid to it, and later turned out to be connected with a political forum whose participants might be scrutinized for foreign influence, appears at least as an object for in-depth verification.
Especially since Frantskevich's entire biography consists of transitions between environments with sensitive information: migrants, political refugees, opposition organizations, families of the deceased, Belarusian volunteers, and military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to which they belong. The latter is particularly delicate material.
It cannot be claimed that Frantskevich did not come into the sight of Belarusian and Russian security forces at all. In December 2023, his residence in Belarus was searched, and in 2024, his data appeared in the Russian wanted database.
On the one hand, this may indicate a real interest of repressive bodies in Frantskevich, but only after the start of his activities in Ukraine.
On the other hand, this is far from an alibi, because there are cases when the special services of Belarus initiated criminal cases against emigrants to create an "alibi" for them. The most striking example, which has already been mentioned, was precisely connected with a fugitive from Belarus to that same Czech Republic. Czech authorities came to suspect that Volha Sudliankova, who received asylum as a victim of political repression, had worked for the GRU for many years. She eventually left for Moscow.
What Frantskevich himself answered us
"Nasha Niva" repeatedly asked Aliaksei Frantskevich to answer questions about his biography that we had, but he refused.
"I don't know you and I don't understand what goal you are pursuing," he told the journalist. "For people who know me and are close to me, there are no 'white spots' in my biography — they know me, my activities, and my position."
"Nasha Niva," however, is ready to give Mr. Frantskevich the floor if he decides to speak with us.
Less is more
What conclusions can be drawn? Episodes from Aliaksei Frantskevich's biography form a peculiar picture.
Could it be that a person in the past made quite a few, let's say, mistakes and ambiguous actions, but later rethought life and engaged in charity? That could also be.
But if so, then you must honestly and sincerely talk about your past. Public activity requires reasonable transparency.
If a person silences their past and continues to create an untruthful biography for themselves, such a person has no moral right to claim leadership or representation in opposition structures — and he does claim it.
And, as in the stories with Anzhalika Melnikava and Volha Siamashka, the leaders of Belarusian opposition and civil society structures pay insufficient attention to vetting the people they deal with. Moreover, we are not talking about some complex work, but about a simple collection of "objective information" about a person. Not to blindly trust what he says about himself, but to look into databases and ask other people about him.
When reading Frantskevich's biography, what is surprising is not that the Polish special services banned him from entering the country, but that a person with criminal convictions and entirely gray areas in his past biography is invited to events like the "New Belarus" conference. Perhaps it would be better if there were fewer people at such conferences, but no random people. The fact that someone loudly demands to be engaged in dialogue is more a reason to think twice than to invite him for a conversation.
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