Warsaw in Belarus was only interested in the rights of the Polish minority and the Church, that's why it lost — former Polish diplomat

Lukashenka and Putin. Photo: Maxim Shipenkov Pool Photo via AP

In a recent episode of the Polish historical and journalistic project «Dzieje», former Chargé d'affaires of Poland in Belarus Witold Jurasz and journalist Marcin Giezak thoroughly analyzed the anatomy of Belarusian statehood and the mistakes of Polish diplomacy.

Jurasz, who headed the Polish diplomatic mission in Minsk at the turn of the 2000s and 2010s, shared sober, sometimes ironic, conclusions about why Alexander Lukashenka created a system capable of outliving generations, and why the West never managed to offer Minsk anything but moral admonitions.

Павялічыць

Former Chargé d'affaires of Poland in Belarus Witold Jurasz. Video screenshot

In Polish, and generally in Western discourse, Alexander Lukashenka is usually depicted as an uneducated collective farm chairman who rules the country solely through brute force and Kremlin subsidies.

Jurasz reminds us that the Belarusian politician has a historical education and is a very ambitious and politically astute person. He is capable of appearing as a simple village uncle to one audience and as a tough but pragmatic manager to another. His first electoral victory in 1994, the diplomat believes, was absolutely legitimate, as he sold the image of an uncompromising sheriff to a society tired of the chaos and corruption of democratic disarray.

The "vertical" he created fundamentally differs from its Russian or Ukrainian counterparts. In Belarus, there are no classic oligarchs capable of influencing decision-making or creating their own media or financial empires. Instead, there is a system of loyalty among lower echelons.

While in Russia generals and colonels live better than others, and petty officials and lieutenants have to live off bribes, in Belarus even an ordinary police sergeant or a director of a provincial library feel like beneficiaries of the regime.

The system supports their relatively stable standard of living, which is why in critical moments this apparatus was defended not only by corrupt elites but also by millions of rank-and-file implementers on the ground.

Historical Trolling at Mir Castle

Jurasz recalls one telling scene that took place during the solemn opening of the restored Mir Castle.

Lithuania, understanding the weight of historical diplomacy, sent a powerful delegation there led by the Minister of Culture and the chairman of the parliamentary commission.

The Polish minister, responsible for the relevant portfolio, demonstratively refused to go to the "last dictator" at the last moment. As a result, rank-and-file diplomat Jurasz had to answer for all of Warsaw.

When Alexander Lukashenka approached to greet them and was presented with this modest Polish "landing party" against the backdrop of a large Lithuanian retinue, he instantly reacted, quipping: "Well, you once took their capital [meaning Vilnius — NN], and now they will take history from you."

Jurasz was impressed by these words, because this was not at all the game of a foolish provincial, as Lukashenka was imagined in Poland. This was a thoughtful, sharp, and very cynical taunt from a person who perfectly knows history and knows how to play on the weaknesses of his neighbors.

Salon Moralizing Versus Realpolitik

Paradoxically, in 1994, it was Poland that secretly supported Lukashenka, considering him a young fighter against the Soviet nomenclature. This was an adventurous gamble that completely failed.

Warsaw's subsequent policy, however, suffered from another ailment — tunnel vision. Polish elites viewed Belarus exclusively through the prism of the rights of the Polish minority and the Catholic Church, completely ignoring issues of military security, economy, and geopolitical neighborhood.

Warsaw tried to talk to the dictator about democracy, which for him was equivalent to losing power and physical annihilation.

Instead, Jurasz believes, it was necessary to seek a pragmatic compromise between values and interests. It would have been worthwhile to offer the regime a form of "soft authoritarianism" — to demand that opponents, after detentions, emerge from prisons alive and unharmed, and in return, open the doors for joint business.

If not thirty, but three hundred large Polish enterprises operated in Belarus, Minsk would have faced concrete financial losses from a rupture with the West. However, every time Lukashenka experienced serious financial crises and sought an alternative to the Kremlin, the West refused to put real money on the table through international funds, which further pushed him into Russia's embrace.

When Polish diplomats tried to teach the Belarusian regime about democracy, they often met with coldness not only in Minsk but also among their own allies.

Jurasz recalls his conversation with an American colleague who had served in Uzbekistan before Belarus.

When he asked why the USA did not demand democracy from Islam Karimov's harsh regime but so stubbornly pressured Minsk, the American honestly and without diplomatic etiquette replied that they truly didn't care at all about Belarus.

For Washington, it was merely a function in relations with Moscow. Warsaw, blindly copying American rhetoric, was losing its own geopolitical space.

Belarus as the "Fourth Baltic Republic"

Western analysts love to repeat Jacek Kuroń's phrase that every nation gets the government it deserves. But upon closer inspection of Belarusian society, this formula severely fails.

Jurasz, having moved to Minsk after four years of work in Moscow, was shocked by the contrast. Belarusians, by their temperament, turned out to be completely unlike Russians. In his opinion, Belarus is more like the "fourth Baltic republic".

This difference was felt in everything. During a trip from Moscow to Warsaw, on the Russian side, diplomats saw broken roads and policemen who stopped cars twice in a few hours for bribes. As soon as the Belarusian border was crossed — ideal asphalt appeared, working traffic lights, and in a week of traveling around the country, no one even hinted at corruption. Belarusians are historically alien to Great Russian arrogance and aggression towards the West.

This characteristic manifests even in trifles. One of the Polish rectors noted in a conversation with Jurasz that a dormitory populated by Ukrainian students is an eternal party with loud music and police, whereas in a "Belarusian" dormitory, at half past ten in the evening, there is complete silence, because one needs to go to classes in the morning.

Belarusians — a friendly and law-abiding people — did not deserve the fate imposed on them by history, but the mistakes of past decades deprived them of an alternative, the diplomat believes.

"Reset" and a Hazy Future

Today, the situation has changed irrevocably, Jurasz believes. Belarus has de facto lost its sovereignty, becoming a springboard for Russian military adventures. But the political absurdity continues: now, when any attempts to negotiate with Lukashenka have lost strategic meaning, another "reset" is again being lobbied in Polish circles.

The reason for this is the banal greed of certain former special service employees and lobbyists who expect to earn millions from the import of Belarusian potash fertilizers under the guise of talks about "dialogue".

If Alexander Lukashenka is no longer there, Warsaw will find itself in the role of a helpless spectator. The diplomat doubts that Belarus will transform into a hereditary monarchy, as this idea completely contradicts the mentality of the people.

Russia certainly has a ready plan and its candidates for replacement, while Poland and the West in general do not even have the opportunity to enter this game.

Columbus discovered America, Lincoln abolished slavery, and Lukashenka, in Jurasz's opinion, will be able to say about himself — "such a country we fucked up".

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