Atomic Dreams of Soviet Belarus: Braslau, Vitebsk, Lukoml or Polesie? Why a large-scale network of nuclear power plants never appeared in Belarus
In the late 1970s, the leadership of the BSSR considered plans that today seem fantastic. The republic was supposed to be covered with a network of giant nuclear power plants and become a European energy donor. Reactors could have appeared near Vitebsk, Byaroza, on the picturesque shore of Lake Lukoml, or even in the Prypyat swamps, where an artificial sea and a new city of Vidzibor were supposed to emerge. However, these plans remained only on paper, encountering natural peculiarities and Soviet bureaucracy. The Chernobyl disaster was only the final chord in their demise.

The Belarusian NPP could have appeared not in Astravets, but decades earlier on completely different sites. Photo: Nasha Niva
Energy Hunger
The problem of its own energy deficit became acutely apparent in Soviet Belarus already in the post-war decade. Rapid industrialization and swift urbanization demanded colossal volumes of electricity for new factories and cities. At the same time, the republic was virtually deprived of natural resources: there were no rich deposits of hard coal, only peat and brown coal, and the flat terrain put an end to the construction of powerful and efficient hydroelectric power plants.
The only solution seemed to be a peaceful atom.
The first official step towards its own NPP was a letter from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the BSSR, Nikolai Avkhimovich, to the Union leadership in Moscow as early as 1957. The Belarusian premier asked to begin designing "one or two" stations, based purely on economic feasibility.
The chronology of how the BSSR fought for nuclear energy can be accurately reconstructed thanks to the article by historian Uladzimir Monzul, published in the magazine "Belarusian Dumka". The fate of the researcher himself, by the way, turned out to be quite specific: recognized as the best archivist in Belarus, he first wrote a political denunciation against neighbors for a flyer in the entrance, and then fell under the repression machine himself and received home confinement.
As archives testify, by the mid-1960s, confidence in the safety of nuclear energy had finally formed in Soviet offices. Specialists from the USSR Ministry of Energy unequivocally stated in their reports that nuclear power plants "do not cause any concerns from the point of view of safety and atmospheric pollution."
Developing the General Scheme for Energy Development, Moscow identified the northwestern part of the USSR (including Belarus) as a priority zone for NPP construction.
In 1968-1969, specialists from the Leningrad Institute "Teploelektroproekt" (LOTEP) began large-scale surveys in the territory of the republic.

Perspective sites for NPP construction considered in the 1960s. Those remaining after initial screening are highlighted in red, Ignolina site in Lithuania, where an NPP was eventually built, is in blue. Photo: OSM / Nasha Niva
The main and most stringent criterion for NPP placement was the availability of a huge amount of fresh water for reactor cooling. Geologists and engineers surveyed 17 potential sites in all six regions: from Asipovichy and Babruysk to Narach and Rasony.
Most of them, 14 options, were soon discarded for various reasons, including proximity to military facilities. The most promising were recognized as the Brozhskaya site near Babruysk (on the site of exhausted peat bogs) and Snudskaya - on the shore of Lake Snudy north of Braslau.

Letter from the USSR Ministry of Energy from October 1970 on the main directions of energy development of the BSSR in the 9th Five-Year Plan, which states that the construction of the Belarusian NPP is scheduled to begin in 1973-1974.
The leadership of the BSSR made every effort to expedite the start of construction to close the forecasted energy deficit already in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1971-1975). And they almost succeeded.
In September 1971, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed a joint resolution, which finally approved the construction of the Belarusian NPP at the Snudskaya site.
However, literally a year later, when construction work had not yet begun, the powerful Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR proposed reviewing the decision. The reason was purely pragmatic: the neighboring Druksai point, located literally nearby, on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, had much better soils. Building there was cheaper and simpler, which allowed for a significant reduction in capital investments in the zero cycle.

Ignalina NPP, built literally on the border of Belarus. It was for its sake that the Union authorities canceled the approved project for a powerful Belarusian station on the neighboring Lake Snudy, considering Lithuanian soils more reliable and cheaper for construction.
The decision was changed without much debate. The project "moved" to Lithuania, where the construction of the famous Ignalina NPP soon began. It, of course, provided electricity to parts of Belarusian territories, but the BSSR once again remained in a state of energy dependence and was forced to start the struggle for its own peaceful atom anew.
Giants on Lakes and Polesie Swamps
The loss of the Snudskaya site did not stop the atomic ambitions of the BSSR leadership. On the contrary, the energy hunger only worsened. While in 1965 electricity consumption in the republic was 7.5 billion kWh, by 1980 this figure was supposed to quadruple.
To ensure such a volume, Moscow planned not just one station, but a whole network of nuclear giants.
The true scale of atomic planning fell on the late 1970s. According to the strategic plans of the USSR Ministry of Energy, as many as three NPPs were to appear in Belarus.
In 1987, it was planned to start the construction of a station in the south of the republic with a capacity of 4000-6000 MW, in 1988 - in the north with a colossal capacity of 8000-10000 MW, and in 1992 - another one in the southeast with a capacity of 6000-8000 MW.
To understand the scale of these figures, it is enough to mention that the capacity of the modern Belarusian NPP in Astravets is only 2400 MW.

NPP placement scheme at the Vitebsk site. 1983. Photo: "Belarusian Dumka"
One of the largest NPPs in the world was planned to be built north of Vitebsk, on the shore of Lake Vymna in Haradok district, for which the area of the natural lake was to be increased several times by diverting water from the Dvina via a special pipeline.
In the Brest region, southeast of Lake Chornae, a complex energy complex was designed, where an atomic station was planned to be combined with underground pumped-hydro storage stations, which would pump water underground at night and release it during the day, rotating additional turbines.
Perhaps the most fantastic project was considered in the Stolin district. In a heavily swampy area between Stolin and Davyd-Haradok, an artificial cooling sea with an area of up to 36 square kilometers (the size of Lakes Lukomlskaye, Dryvyaty or Drysvyaty) was to be created, supplied with water from the Prypyat, and a new 25,000-person settlement of energy workers was to be built at the Vidzibor station.
While designers were drawing artificial seas on maps, a real struggle unfolded for the central site - south of Lake Lukoml. This option became considered the most priority from the late 1970s. However, engineers slightly changed the location: instead of Lake Lukoml itself, the site was moved to the shore of the neighboring picturesque Lake Syalyava in Krupski district.
The Minsk Regional Executive Committee strongly opposed this, as the "Proshytskiya Baloty" hydrological reserve was located near the lake. The energy specialists promised to provide funds for environmental protection, and in January 1984, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the BSSR finally approved this site.

Perspective sites for NPP construction considered in the 1970s-1980s. The Syalyava site, where the first Belarusian NPP was eventually to be built, and the Minsk ATETs, for the construction of which all republican forces were redirected, are highlighted in red; NPPs built in neighboring Soviet republics are in blue. Photo: OSM / Nasha Niva
It seemed that the fate of the Belarusian peaceful atom was decided. Preparatory work was supposed to begin already in 1985. But bureaucratic slowness intervened: all forces and means of the republic at that moment were thrown into the construction of the Minsk Atomic Heat and Power Plant (ATETs), which was being built with serious delays from the schedule.
This delay became fatal for the Syalyava project, as in the spring of 1986, the fourth power unit in Chernobyl exploded.
The Road to Astravets
The Chernobyl disaster in 1986 shattered all Soviet plans. NPP construction in Belarus was immediately frozen, and society was gripped by a natural radiophobia. Even the government program for energy development, adopted in the early 1990s, had to be curtailed under pressure from a special commission of scientists and the public, who voted for a ten-year moratorium on any talk about the peaceful atom.
However, the economic reality of the early 2000s and the rapid rise in prices for Russian energy carriers forced the Belarusian authorities to return to the nuclear topic. In 2005, a new Energy Security Concept was approved, which officially provided for the construction of its own nuclear power plant.
When modern specialists began to choose a location for the future station, they turned to old Soviet experience and retrieved data from archives about dozens of potential sites. Among the main contenders were the Krasnapolskaya (Chavusy district) and Kukshynauskaya (Shklov district) sites in the Mogilev region, which had not previously been among the promising ones. But in 2006-2007, these eastern locations were considered absolutely priority.
Geologists began actively drilling the ground, and the result shocked both designers and officials. At a depth of only 25 meters, powerful layers of waterlogged chalk were found, whose thickness reached 35 meters.
This meant a very high probability of karst processes - when groundwater gradually washes away rock and forms giant voids underground. Placing a multi-ton nuclear reactor on such unstable ground would be technological suicide.
Ukrainian specialists, who consulted Belarusians at that time, cited the example of their Rivne NPP, where, due to similar karst phenomena, thousands of tons of concrete constantly had to be pumped under the station buildings. No one in Belarus wanted to repeat such an expensive and dangerous experience. Specialists again changed the dislocation, turning to the Kukshynauskaya site, but the picture repeated itself there too.
It turned out that almost all of eastern Belarus is located above layers of chalk soil.

Astravets NPP. Photo: Nasha Niva
Faced with an insurmountable geological barrier, the authorities were forced to turn to a backup option - the Astravets site in Hrodna region. This location, which hardly appeared in the lists in Soviet times, suddenly turned out to be ideal. Studies showed that its foundation is a monolithic bedrock without any geological surprises or hidden voids. This is how Astravets became the first atomic capital of Belarus, although decades before it, several other Belarusian cities could have already held this status.
Second Belarusian NPP
Now, with the first Belarusian NPP already operating and supplying energy to the grid, the authorities are increasingly announcing plans to build a second nuclear power plant.
As early as autumn 2025, Lukashenka stated that an internationally recognized site "south of Mogilev" was being considered. The meaning of such a location is apparently dictated by foreign policy and trade interests. Astravets was built with an eye on exporting cheap electricity to Lithuania, where the only Ignalina NPP was closed, and Poland, where serious talks about the first nuclear power plant began quite recently. The plans of the Belarusian authorities did not materialize due to the distrust of neighboring countries in the safety of the Russian project, sanctions, and economic blockade. The new eastern NPP is supposed to produce energy that will be sold to Russian regions.
However, the main, yet unresolved question remains: what about the chalk and karst formations that caused the eastern sites to be categorically rejected in the late 2000s?
«Nasha Niva» — the bastion of Belarus
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