Can North Korean troops come to Belarus in case of escalation on the border with Ukraine?

Alexander Lukashenka and Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang, North Korea, March 26, 2026. Photo: Belarus Presidential Press Service via AP

In the past few days, Kyiv has publicly spoken several times about a new threat from Belarus. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Belarus continues to build military infrastructure near the Ukrainian border, which could be used for aggression. According to him, roads, ammunition depots, and fuel storage bases are being built near the border. At the same time, Zelenskyy claims that these facilities are directly mentioned in Russian documents in the context of the tasks of the so-called "special military operation".

Another alarming statement was made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi. He did not rule out that, failing to achieve a breakthrough in the main sectors of the front, Russia might try to open a new direction, expanding the front by another approximately 160 kilometers at the expense of the Belarusian direction. According to him, Ukraine already has to prepare additional brigades in case of such developments.

Against this backdrop, the question arises: if the Kremlin is indeed looking for ways to change the course of the war, could Belarus become one of the main instruments of such a new escalation? And could Russia go even further — for example, use a North Korean contingent in Belarus, which is already helping it in the war against Ukraine?

"Nasha Niva" asked Finnish and Ukrainian experts what Russia might do.

Moscow is already looking for reserves

The war against Ukraine has long ceased to be a war solely of Russian resources. Russia receives drones and technologies from Iran, and artillery shells, missiles, and even military personnel from North Korea. North Korean units have already operated on Russian territory, and cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang has reached an unprecedented level after the signing of a new agreement. North Korea supplied Russia with artillery shells, missiles, multiple rocket launcher systems, and sent military personnel to participate in combat operations on Russia's side.

NATO confirmed in October 2024 that North Korean units had been transferred to Russia and deployed in the Kursk region. It was later reported that about 10-12 thousand DPRK servicemen might have been there. Part of them, according to the Ukrainian side and allied intelligence, participated in battles against Ukrainian forces. An analysis of a new memorial to Korean servicemen in Pyongyang made it possible to calculate that 2300 of them died.

A separate line of assistance is ammunition. According to the Open Source Centre, since mid-2023, the DPRK could have supplied Russia with tens of thousands of containers with ammunition — which could amount to millions of artillery shells and missiles.

Moscow pays for the participation of North Korean troops, and quite expensively.

"The hypothesis is interesting, but there are two points"

Grigory Nizhnikov, a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, believes that the scenario of transferring North Korean military personnel to Belarus can theoretically be discussed, but as of today, it seems unlikely.

The first problem is legal.

"If North Korean troops are deployed in Russia, there is a corresponding agreement for that — a military alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang. But there is no such agreement between Minsk and North Korea. Consequently, there is no legal instrument as to how or why these troops should be deployed on Belarusian territory. Without an appropriate request from Lukashenka to the DPRK, this is impossible," Nizhnikov explains.

He notes that for Putin, formality still matters, not as genuine law, but as a "fig leaf".

"He will always look for some legal loophole to say: look, the law is on my side. Even if it looks like a fig leaf," says the expert.

The second problem is practical. According to Nizhnikov, Moscow currently needs North Korean military personnel and resources primarily where the direct war is ongoing: in Russia or in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Transferring them to Belarus does not provide an obvious military advantage.

"If North Korean troops are transferred from Russian territory to Belarus, then someone must take their place in Russia. And Moscow has no free troops. For it, it is now more important to keep resources for the main objectives — on the territory of Russia or occupied Ukraine," Nizhnikov notes.

If the situation changes, Moscow's logic may also change

"If the war enters another phase and Moscow has different interests, different resources, then one can look at it differently. But a much more probable scenario is Russian troops in Belarus," says Nizhnikov.

He also draws attention to another factor — China. The deepening military alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang does not necessarily satisfy Beijing, which traditionally considers North Korea its zone of influence. Therefore, the expansion of the DPRK's role in the European war could cause additional tension for China.

Belarus as a "black hole"

The main danger, according to Nizhnikov, is that Belarus increasingly looks like a territory that Moscow can use at any moment — for military, political, or hybrid operations.

"Belarus is becoming such a black hole. How it will be used to achieve Moscow's military and political goals is an open and dangerous question. And this will be a very heavy burden for Belarus and its future," says the expert.

He believes that the longer the war goes on, the less Russia will restrain itself. And the more likely it is that Belarus will again be tried to be used as an instrument of pressure — on Ukraine, Europe, or NATO.

At the same time, according to Nizhnikov, Moscow does not want a direct war with NATO: it has no resources for that. But it can look for a "gray zone" — limited attacks, provocations, hybrid operations, after which Western countries will not have a political consensus for a harsh response.

"Russia will act in such a way that it does not look like a declaration of war. And Belarus is a very useful tool here. Lukashenka himself constantly repeats that he has a 'finger on the button,' and then it can be said: maybe Lukashenka did it," Nizhnikov explains.

Why Zelenskyy is putting pressure now

The expert views Volodymyr Zelenskyy's public ultimatum to Lukashenka as military-political pressure on the regime.

"The issue is not just about repeaters. Ukraine understands well that Belarus is a source of threats for it. And not just a source of threats, but a weak point in the Russian military machine that can be pressured," says Nizhnikov.

According to him, for Kyiv, this could be an attempt to show Lukashenka's weakness and force Moscow to invest more resources in controlling Belarus, rather than in the offensive in Donbas.

"If, through informational-political and partly military pressure, the situation in Belarus can be destabilized, this will be a serious result for Ukraine. Moscow will have to invest in maintaining the situation in Belarus, rather than in new divisions for Donbas," the expert notes.

The report that repeaters on Belarusian territory have ceased to operate may look like the first result of this pressure.

Павялічыць

Collage: Nasha Niva

"Belarus cannot be drawn into war, it is already in it"

For Kyiv, Belarus has long ceased to be neutral territory.

Dmitry Gramakov, a sociologist and expert at the International Center for Countering Russian Aggression, believes that the question of whether Belarus can be "drawn into the war" does not correspond to reality at all.

"Belarus is already in this war. Since February 24, 2022, it has provided its territory for aggression against Ukraine, allowed attacks on Ukraine, and has been supporting Russian aggression for the fourth year. Therefore, it is simply impossible to say that someone can draw Belarus into the war," he notes.

According to the expert, modern warfare has long ceased to be limited only to combat operations.

"This is only one-sixth of modern hybrid warfare. Belarus is already fighting alongside Russia in other dimensions — in the informational, diplomatic, and economic spheres. It does not join sanctions against Russia, supports it on international platforms, and continues cooperation that helps wage war. Therefore, it is impossible to say that Belarus is outside the war," says Gramakov.

It is precisely from this, according to him, that Kyiv's current sharp rhetoric stems.

The expert points out that Volodymyr Zelenskyy's demands concerned not only repeaters, which, according to the Ukrainian side, were used to support Russian drone attacks.

"Zelenskyy's words also concerned the supply of fuel to the Russian Federation and the provision of fuel to Russian occupation forces. Most likely, Minsk or Moscow simply chose the lesser evil to maintain the status quo. If Belarus is playing on Russia's side in the informational, logistical, economic, and other spheres, then why should Moscow now force Lukashenka to also send Belarusian troops to the front? Russians simply don't need this yet," he explains.

"If Minsk only understands the language of ultimatums, it will be spoken to in that language"

To the question of whether there will be new ultimatums from Kyiv, the expert answers unequivocally:

"Yes, ultimatums will continue. If Minsk does not understand another language, then it will be spoken to in the language it understands. Will these demands concern oil refineries or other enterprises? Possibly. Everything will depend on how much the products of these enterprises threaten Ukraine's security and influence the course of military operations."

Павялічыць

Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Photo: Jonathan Raa / NurPhoto via Getty Images

According to Gramakov, if Minsk ignores such demands, Ukraine does not rule out tougher actions.

"Ukraine, apart from its statehood and independence, has nothing left to lose. If any threat from Belarus becomes real, all available means will be used to eliminate it," the expert notes.

"Lukashenka might have seen a Russian provocation in the bus incident"

Dmitry Gramakov draws attention to another circumstance — the story with a Belarusian bus that came under drone attack in Russia's Bryansk region.

According to the expert, Minsk might not have received full information about this incident from Moscow.

"The Russians did not allow anyone to investigate, not even their allies from Minsk. And that's why Minsk may believe it was a provocation by the Russians themselves," he says.

According to Gramakov, if this is indeed the case, Lukashenka could have perceived the incident as a way for the Kremlin to pressure him.

"Lukashenka understands that this is not a provocation for him to enter the war from Ukraine, but pressure on him from Russia. Therefore, he is cautious with his words," the expert believes.

"Lukashenka's apologies change nothing"

Commenting on Lukashenka's recent words, who apologized to Zelenskyy for his earlier statements, the expert notes: Kyiv evaluates actions, not words.

"As President Zelenskyy said, we don't need apologies — we need actions that will reduce our risks. After 2022, Ukraine perceives only concrete actions as signals. If the repeaters are indeed disabled and no longer used against Ukraine, then this can be considered some kind of signal. But words alone change nothing."

According to Gramakov, the apologies were probably not addressed to Kyiv.

"This was more of an attempt by Lukashenka to improve his own image before the audience of an Arab TV channel to which he gave an interview. For Ukraine, this is neither a diplomatic step nor a step towards reconciliation."

The expert emphasizes that the possibility of Russia's renewed use of Belarusian territory is considered a real threat in Kyiv:

"If Belarus becomes a participant in a new aggression, Belarus itself will receive a response. We will consider this as aggression specifically from Belarus."

According to him, the perception will be the same at the international level: "Ukraine today openly warns the Belarusian authorities: any new act of aggression on their part will become a reason for a direct response against Belarus."

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