"Assaults on Credit." How the Front in Russian General Staff Reports Differs from Reality

Vladimir Putin is not for the first time exaggerating the Russian army's achievements in capturing Ukrainian territories. Photo: Aleksandr Kazakov / TASS

Putin's statements about Russian advances contradict data from independent observers: fighting continues in Konstantinovka, Lyman remains under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the front line in the Sumy direction has not changed since April, and there are no encirclements in the Oskol river area.

Vladimir Putin is not for the first time exaggerating the Russian army's achievements in capturing Ukrainian territories: he has now effectively admitted that Russian troops do not control Kupyansk, although he twice stated at the end of last year that the city had been taken.

On June 12, the Russian leader claimed that Russian troops were "approaching Zaporizhzhia."

But documents from the 58th Army and data from independent researchers show that Russian General Staff maps in this direction can diverge from reality by tens of kilometers with potentially fatal consequences for Russian military personnel operating in the area.

The BBC Russian Service studied staff documents and found out how an army fights when its perception of the front does not match reality.

On Russia Day, June 12, after being awarded the titles of Heroes of Labour and receiving state prizes, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russian army assault troops. He had a conversation with one of them:

"With this chevron of our battalion, last year we took the settlements of Kamenske and Stepove in the Zaporizhzhia region, and we consider this our small gift to you," stated Lieutenant Sergey Chuvashov, commander of the airborne assault platoon of the 247th airborne assault regiment, as he presented the chevron to the president as a gift.

— That's the Dnipro grouping, isn't it? — Putin clarified.

— Exactly!

— Gradually approaching Zaporizhzhia?

— Exactly!

— Good luck to you.

This statement caused surprise among everyone — from independent military specialists to z-channel authors — as the Russian army is not even close to "approaching" Zaporizhzhia. The Russian army has not been able to reach this regional center, which Vladimir Putin formally incorporated into Russia back in October 2022 (after which the mention of the Zaporizhzhia region even appeared in the Russian Constitution), even in the fifth year of the invasion.

On the contrary, the Russian offensive in this sector of the front stopped several months ago, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to regain control over Stepnohirsk — a settlement slightly north of Kamenske and Stepove — and also liberate some territories on the border of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.

But staff documents concerning the actions of the 58th and 5th Armies, which are part of the "Dnipro" grouping and operate in this direction, answer the question of where Vladimir Putin draws his confidence that the Russian army "is confidently advancing daily in all operational directions."

"Assaults" on credit

Павялічыць

This is a section of the front in the Zaporizhzhia region, according to data from the American Institute for the Study of War on June 13, 2026. It marks the very same settlements of Kamenske and Stepove, which, according to Lieutenant Chuvashov who spoke with Putin, his battalion assaulted last year. The section almost perfectly matches the map of the Ukrainian Deepstate project, which often (with a certain delay) reflects changes on the line of combat contact.

However, according to the data from staff maps and accompanying documents of the 58th Army, Russian troops supposedly left this territory long ago, having advanced 16-20 km north into Ukrainian territory on April 9.

Павялічыць

Official statements from the Russian side coincide with the staff maps by which the army conducts combat operations — and all of this strongly diverges from reality.

Thus, according to Russian generals, the settlements of Rachne — "taken" on January 30, Prymorske — whose capture Andrey Belousov congratulated servicemen of the 108th regiment on February 15, 2026, and on the same day, Zapasne and Magdalynivka were "taken." Belousov congratulated servicemen of the 247th regiment on the capture of Veselianka on March 4. And on the capture of Mala Tokmachka, a small village in the Zaporizhzhia region that has already become a cultural phenomenon, Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov congratulated the 42nd Motor Rifle Division back on November 17, 2025. At the same time, according to independent military researchers and satellite imagery, it is quite clear that as of June 2026, this village has not been captured by Russian troops.

The last statement by the Russian Ministry of Defense about the capture of a settlement in the Zaporizhzhia region is dated June 4, when the department announced the alleged capture of the village of Huliaipilske (it was referred to by its old Soviet name "Komsomolske"). On the staff map from April 9, the front is marked as passing along the border of this village, which is north of the still-uncaptured Mala Tokmachka. This means this section of the Russian staff map has already been "colored in."

"Coloring in" (закрасы) is slang for marking territories on military maps as occupied or liberated before reliable confirmation of control over them appears. Russian generals are often accused by even pro-war bloggers of excessive adherence to this method.

A similar situation occurred in the Zaporizhzhia region: maps from the American Institute for the Study of War and the Ukrainian Deepstate project show that all these settlements, located north of Stepnohirsk, which was abandoned by Russian troops, are deep in the rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Russian troops have not yet approached them.

The difference between what the Ministry of Defense "took" in its reports and "colored in" on staff maps as controlled by Russia, and the real front line, can range from 10 to 20 kilometers in various places.

Павялічыць

Zaporizhzhia, which Vladimir Putin formally incorporated into Russia in October 2022, has not been reached by the Russian army in the fifth year of the invasion (pictured: Russian Uragan multiple launch rocket system in the Zaporizhzhia region). Photo: Alexey Konovalov / TASS

"Coloring in and advances"

"Coloring in" in the Russian general staff is not limited to the leadership of the "Dnipro" grouping. For example, z-war correspondent Vladimir Romanov wrote on June 14 that precisely the same discrepancy between the real front line and the lines on staff maps was recently discovered in the Konstantinovka sector of the front.

"The inspectors actually went to the LCC (fighters from the sector express their respect to those two colonels)," he wrote. "The result was the discovery of a discrepancy between the real and declared LCC (LCC - Line of Combat Contact - BBC) - to a depth of up to 17 kilometers. Do you know what the local command did as a result of such an investigation? Sent 40 people (including UAV operators) to assault the 'colored in' section. All 40 people were gone in 2 hours."

"Reports that run ahead and 'coloring in' are unlikely to benefit advancing Russian troops," warned Mikhail Zvinchuk, author of the large pro-war channel "Rybar," on June 8. "'Credit' lines on other fronts have more than once become the cause of incorrect situation assessment and, as a result, a source of problems."

The most famous "coloring in" in the history of the Russian invasion of Ukraine was committed by General Sergey Kuzovlev, commander of the "West" grouping. At the end of 2025, he reported to Vladimir Putin that his grouping's servicemen had completed the assault on Kupyansk and taken it completely under their control, for which the general received the title of Hero of Russia. In reality, Kupyansk, on the contrary, was cleared of Russian servicemen by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and all objective situation control maps on the front line indicate that the ruins of this city are currently under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

"In the Zaporizhzhia region, we have advances of kilometers every day. 1.2 kilometers, 1.3 kilometers, 800 meters. The same depth along the front," Vladimir Putin said about the situation in the same Zaporizhzhia region on June 4, while in St. Petersburg at the international economic forum. And the same z-war correspondent Romanov commented on his words: "The Zaporizhzhia region snatches the palm from the 'West' grouping in terms of 'coloring in' and advances! The Ministry of Defense, apparently, preferred to keep silent to the President about Stepnohirsk."

Russian troops had retreated from Stepnohirsk by that time.

Павялічыць

The settlements captured by the Russian army most often lie in ruins. Photo: TASS

Endless Offensive

As early as autumn 2022, after the heavy defeat of the Russian army east of Kharkiv, British historian and military expert Chris Owen noted that Russian army officers often lied to their superiors about the real state of affairs and the status of their unit.

"The consequences of these lies were likely very severe for the Russian military. Command decisions — where and when to attack and defend — were clearly made based on false information. This led to numerous unnecessary casualties and military failures," Owen wrote, providing many confirmations of what he said.

The daily reports of the official representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense, General Konashenkov, literally became memes as early as 2022. For example, on June 26, 2022, Konashenkov reported the destruction of Ukrainian military equipment that exceeded its quantity at the beginning of the war — even considering possible deliveries.

Konashenkov no longer appears on television screens, but the perception of the top Russian leadership about the situation on the front line has not fundamentally changed.

A study of staff documents from the 58th and 5th Armies shows that military bureaucracy not only has not disappeared but has become even more demanding in terms of reporting achievements. Russian servicemen must account for every shell fired — justify the necessity of the shot and report its results. It can be assumed that no one wants to honestly write in a report — "missed" or "don't know where it hit." In most of the corresponding columns, there is a mark: target suppressed/hit/destroyed. Such reports are summed up across all fronts, and the final report is placed on the desk of high command.

At the same time, reports on the use of UAVs look much more modest: the mark "target hit" is rarely made, more often - "UAV shot down/suppressed by enemy EW/lost communication," etc. Probably, in the case of drones, the Russian military command does not believe mere words - visual confirmation of a successful attack is required.

"Flag-planting" (in military slang, this refers to geo-located photo or video recording of penetration into enemy rear) is precisely one of the ways to visually confirm success. Although such success may be debatable or temporary, footage demonstrating a flag serves as documentary evidence of the advance of assault groups and is used as reports, on the basis of which maps are redrawn.

"Attempts to sugarcoat the real situation with the help of 'flag-planting' look at least ridiculous. The damage from such 'anti-crises' would be less if they remained exclusively online," writes z-blogger Anatoly Radov. "In practice, however, they often cost the lives of fighters sent on a one-way trip to film videos and conceal false reports."

"Coloring in" maps for reports provides a distorted picture of the situation on the battlefield. Let's assume (as many Russian military personnel write) that the headquarters of fighting units have different maps — for reports and with the real line of combat contact. But this alone does not solve the problem.

There are other unpleasant consequences for the Russian army:

• coordination of actions is disrupted. For example, aviation command has strong reasons to refuse to strike "their own" territory, i.e., areas marked on maps as already under Russian control. And ground units, just transferred to a hot sector and not yet familiar with the real disposition of forces on the battlefield, risk unexpectedly encountering the enemy;
• statements about settlements "taken on credit" provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with information about the directions in which Russian troops will concentrate efforts, which facilitates fire counteraction and allows for ambushes on infiltration routes;
• an atmosphere of general distrust thickens in the Russian army. As the well-known pro-war channel "Two Majors" writes, due to the high command's ignorance of the real situation, "some people try to fight not the enemy, but their own information resources." In turn, informed military personnel and z-bloggers grow increasingly skeptical about the adequacy of the high command.

It seems that the Russian military bureaucracy is satisfied with the current state of affairs. In any case, meaningless "flag-planting" and false "coloring in" are rarely punished (if at all) in the Russian army. But incentives for reports about another "capture" of another settlement occur regularly.

"It looks especially stupid how we endlessly 'advance,' and the map moves first in one direction, then in another. And the saddest thing is that some sources for these geniuses are at the top. And maps in the General Staff and Ministry of Defense are drawn on the same principle," lament another Z-channel.

• 1
• 0
• 19
• 1
• 0
• 0
• 0
• 0