"Belarus's Top Leadership Showed Masterful Servility in the Chernobyl History"

In 1986, the first official reports about the Chernobyl disaster appeared only three days later.

And the incident was presented not at all as an emergency, dangerous situation: "an accident happened, the fire was extinguished".

— A few weeks later, Gorbachev spoke. It became clear that the situation was more serious, but he reassured that everything necessary was being done. Half of his speech was generally dedicated to exposing the desire of "reactionary forces" in the West to blacken the USSR, using the topic of the accident, — publicist and political observer Siarhei Naumchyk recalls in a conversation with "Salidarnasts".

Павялічыць

"The system of hiding the truth and calming people worked flawlessly"

— Do you remember that specific day, April 26, 1986 — how did you spend it? How did you learn about the Chernobyl accident?

— Perhaps I knew even less than the "average" person, because I was serving in the army. Our unit was in Zaslonava, Lepel district. And while a resident of Vitebsk, and especially Minsk, had a chance to learn something from rumors or radio voices, in the army the opportunities to get information different from the official one were much less.

We heard that people from some military units were sent to Chernobyl, but what they were doing there and what they saw, I didn't know; I was only demobilized in July.

But even later, when I was already working at the Vitebsk regional newspaper, little information reached me.

Well, yes, the 30-kilometer zone was resettled, houses for migrants are being built in the Homel region, but the fire has long been extinguished, a sarcophagus has been built over the reactor. There was no understanding that this was not just an accident, serious as it might be, but a catastrophe with consequences for millennia. The system of hiding the truth and calming people worked flawlessly.

The first person from whom I heard that something was wrong was my friend and fellow journalism student, documentary filmmaker Uladzimir Dashuk. He came to Vitebsk for a week — he fled the capital to write a script for a film about the Chernobyl zone, which he had recently visited.

It seems he didn't write much then, as we hadn't seen each other for a long time and spent all day talking. Including about what Valodya saw in and around Chernobyl. And it was horrific.

Павялічыць

This was completely different from what was said in TV reports and newspaper publications. By the way, he had problems with submitting the film; it was constantly "cut," and he was required to remove one thing or another.

And soon I learned that an NPP was going to be built near Vitebsk, in the Haradok district, and I joined the campaign against its placement. We won, but that's a separate story.

In short, I came to the Supreme Soviet a convinced opponent of the "peaceful atom" and was included in a special commission to investigate the actions of officials after the Chernobyl accident, created at the request of the BPF (the proposal for the commission was voiced by Liavon Barshcheuski on the very first day of the newly elected parliament's work).

— I was still a child, but I remember that people in Minsk were brought out for both May Day and the May 9 demonstration. As if nothing had happened. In your opinion, how much depended on the political will of Minsk, or were orders expected from the Kremlin? Was the global deception a local initiative, an order from above, or inherently the essence of the Soviet empire, and it couldn't have been otherwise?

— The main goal of our parliamentary commission was precisely to ascertain to what extent state officials acted adequately to the information they had in the first days after the catastrophe and later. And also — who and how resisted conveying truthful information about the danger to the population.

We had to interview dozens of people, from ordinary peasants to ministers and Central Committee secretaries.

In one phrase — the leaders had enough information.

A more detailed conclusion was presented at the session of the Supreme Soviet in June 1991 in the report by the chairman of our commission, Ryhor Viachurski: "The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, Sliunkou, and the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus possessed full information as early as April 29, 1986."

Similar information was also held by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Kavaliou, who on that very day held an operational meeting attended by the Minister of Health of the BSSR, Sauchanka, his employees Kondruseu, Ivchanka, as well as Mazai, Chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee Mikhasyou, and the head of the civil defense staff of the BSSR, Hryshchanin.

Павялічыць

Both Comrade Sliunkou and Comrade Kavaliou advised not to panic and not to alarm the people, because, allegedly, nothing terrible had happened. As a result of such irresponsible behavior by the first leaders of the republic, as well as the respective leaders of the regions and district centers of the republic, the residents of Belarus, along with their children, were everywhere brought out for the May Day demonstration.

Sliunkou and Sauchanka, who later appeared on television screens, reassured the republic's population with tales that "nothing terrible happened, Belarus needs no help, and we will quickly manage this accident ourselves."

Павялічыць

Minsk, May 9, 1986. Photo: fototerra

They indeed "managed" instantly. As early as May 5, 1986, there was an order for all resettled individuals to be diagnosed with "vegetovascular dystonia," which means a nervous system disorder. Well, people got stressed during the relocation to a new place; it happens.

"He Will Go Down in Belarusian History as 'Chernobyl Pilate'"

— The key figure who did everything possible to conceal information was Sliunkou. Moreover, he himself understood the danger: I know the story of how, after visiting contaminated areas, he simply changed clothes in his car and discarded his previous attire.

Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Vasil Nestsiarenka, already in the first days after the accident, recorded a significant increase in the radiation background in Minsk, passed the information to Sliunkou, demanding that people not be driven to the May Day demonstration, and generally that something like a state of emergency be declared — but to no avail.

I still have a tape recording of my conversation with Nestsiarenka. He suffered greatly for the truth; he was threatened with a psychiatric hospital, and he was removed from his position as director of the institute.

Was the concealment of information the result of an order from Moscow or a local initiative? I am convinced that it had the character of mutual interaction.

The leadership of the BSSR understood that Moscow did not want to be overly bothered, and so it did not bother them. And also — it persecuted those in Belarus who could bring the truth to the public.

Ales Adamovich recounted how at some meeting on Chernobyl, the then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikolai Ryzhkov, complained: "There's no salvation from these Ukrainians: give us one thing, give us another, spend even more money. But Belarusians — that's a different story. I ask: 'Do you need anything?' — 'No, we don't need anything, we'll manage ourselves, we have everything!'"

Every empire (and the USSR was an empire) implies the subservience of colonial officials to the center as a condition for career advancement, but the highest leadership of Belarus, in the history of Chernobyl, displayed the highest degree of servility.

Perhaps that's why, a year after the accident, Sliunkou was taken to Moscow, becoming a secretary and member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. A brilliant career! But in the history of Belarus, he will go down as Ales Adamovich named him — "Chernobyl Pilate."

And what about the country's top official, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and his declared "glasnost policy"? Siarhei Naumchyk notes that Gorbachev's role is ambiguous:

— I wrote a letter to Gorbachev asking him to receive our parliamentary group, because it was clear that the final most important decisions were made by him. Surprisingly, Supreme Soviet Chairman Dzemianciej supported me. In February 1991, when Gorbachev visited Minsk (which, incidentally, was his first visit after Chernobyl, and five years had passed!), I managed to meet with him, but very briefly and, in principle, without results.

I thought a lot about Gorbachev's role in the Chernobyl situation. And here are the conclusions I came to. Of course, he shares responsibility for the suppression of truth in the first days and months after the catastrophe, that is undeniable. And references to the Politburo not having full information can only be a partial justification: Western correspondents had it, but the Kremlin did not?

In the USSR, there were scientists, like Vasil Nestsiarenka, who, in the very first hours (not days – hours) declared the danger and made proposals for saving people. Ales Adamovich also appealed to him. But the General Secretary acted according to the same model as the leaders of the USSR before him.

On the other hand, if not for the democratic reforms initiated by Gorbachev, however cautious they were at first, if not for Gorbachev's glasnost, if someone like Grishin or Romanov had been in his place — we would, most likely, have known nothing about the scale of the catastrophe for a very, very long time. Just as we knew nothing about Semipalatinsk for decades.

"The Truth about Chernobyl in the Public Consciousness Revealed the Viciousness of the Communist System"

— You were among those who sought to reveal the full extent of the accident's consequences for our country. How difficult was it to break through this wall of lies and silence?

— Ales Adamovich was the first to start breaking through the wall of silence — from the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, Aliaksandr Kuzmin, he received the same information that Nestsiarenka had sent to Sliunkou. Adamovich then wrote an appeal to Gorbachev, arguing that the situation in Belarus was not at all as local leaders presented it. But for a certain time, it was the struggle of a single individual. Undeniably heroic, but it did not yield the proper result. Later, Ales Mikhailavich himself said that the Belarusian Popular Front brought the topic of Chernobyl to the appropriate level of public attention.

Indeed, the mass rallies organized by the BPF, with thousands of participants, simply could not be silenced. They also drew the attention of the international community, because for a long time in the West, it was believed that only Ukraine suffered from Chernobyl.

I will simply list what the Front did immediately after its formation. April 26, 1989 — "Minute of Sorrow and Silence," when thousands of people stood with candles in the square in front of the Government House; September 30 of the same year — the first Chernobyl March, with thousands of participants, including residents of affected areas.

In November — the Chernobyl "People's Tribunal" with the participation of public representatives, scientists, and journalists, when attention was focused on the harmfulness of the so-called "35-rem concept" (a theory of a supposedly health-safe lifetime radiation dose of 35 rem. The concept was completely debunked by Belarusian scientists).

The then communist leadership obstructed in every way possible. For example, on the day of the first Chernobyl March, an "all-republican subbotnik" (volunteer work day) was scheduled. And when the March did take place, a case was initiated against the organizers — Hienadz Hrushavy and Yuras Khadyka. And I witnessed with my own eyes the attempt to detain Zianon Pazniak at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, where he worked at the time.

But times were already different, and the authorities were forced to react not only by trying to obstruct but also by declassifying at least some information.

Yes, by the end of 1989, newspapers finally published a map of radioactive contamination in Belarus, which the Central Committee leadership presented as a great achievement during the elections to the 12th convocation of the Supreme Soviet. At that time, state officials, for the first time, albeit very cautiously, also spoke about the fact that, allegedly, not everything depended on Minsk; much was decided by Moscow.

Then a shameful fact came to light: it turned out that a significant part of the money allocated to Belarus was sent... to Moscow, to the department that developed the aforementioned dubious "35-rem concept."

For us in the BPF, there was nothing fundamentally new here. In the very first sentences of the Front's electoral platform, it was stated that "the Chernobyl catastrophe ruthlessly revealed our true status within the Union — the status of a semi-colony."

Of course, we understood that salvation was only possible under conditions of true Independence.

As for the political outcome, in Belarus, the truth about Chernobyl resonated in the public consciousness with the truth about Kurapaty. And it revealed the viciousness of the communist system, when the problem is no longer about some principles, theories, or ideas, but a choice between life and death.

In a certain sense, I would compare this to 2020, when people heard statements from the supreme ruler about the harmlessness of COVID and advice to treat it with "a tractor and a bathhouse" — and at the same time saw the real scale of the epidemic, which was killing people by the thousands.

"Belarus Lives in Conditions of Both Ecological and Political Chernobyl"

— Today, the Belarusian authorities assure us of the benefits of the Belarusian NPP, which has already cost Belarusians dearly. There are talks about building a second station or at least another unit, lands previously considered contaminated are being returned to agricultural use, and the construction of a nuclear waste repository is only a matter of time. So, has this regime learned no lessons from Chernobyl?

— The regime has indeed learned lessons: as I said, the truth about Chernobyl once significantly shook the communist system, and the regime understands that only maximum secrecy (and in as many spheres as possible), along with repression and Moscow's support, can guarantee its preservation.

I recall how, at the session of the Supreme Soviet, deputies of the BPF Opposition presented facts about the "smearing" of radiation across Belarus. An order was given to mix radioactive grain and meat in proportions of 1:10 and even, in some cases, 1:1, and distribute it to "clean" regions of Belarus, specifically to 50 settlements. And even to supply it outside Belarus.

There was a case when a trainload of such meat was delivered somewhere in the Caucasus, where radiation was measured, and it was returned to Minsk with the recommendation: "Meat — destroy, wagons — decontaminate."

This resonated throughout Belarus, and then it was possible to stop this practice. As is known, lands previously considered "relatively safe" were also withdrawn from agricultural production.

But already in 1993, lands slowly began to be returned to circulation, and from 1994, this process accelerated. And while previously the dangers of such practices could be discussed from the parliamentary rostrum or in the press, and opposed, with Lukashenka's arrival, even the opportunity to at least inform people about the danger disappeared.

Society does not know what is happening. It is deprived of even minimal control mechanisms — parliament, free press, environmental NGOs.

Under such conditions, the authorities can sow contaminated areas, mix radioactive meat with clean meat, and erect ten nuclear power plants or build a nuclear waste repository even in the center of Minsk. And anyone who raises their voice against this will be thrown behind bars for "extremism" or, even worse, for "divulging state secrets."

In this sense, Belarus has returned to 1986 and lives under conditions of both ecological and political Chernobyl.

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